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DISTORTED DRUG PATENTS
Erika Lietzan*
Kristina M.L. Acri née Lybecker**
Abstract: Drug patents are distorted. Unlike most other inventors, drug inventors must
complete ears of testing to the government s specifications and seek government approval to
commercialize their inventions. All the while, the patent term runs. When a drug inventor
finally launches a medicine that embodies the invention, only a fraction of the patent life
remains. And yet, conventional wisdom holds and empirical studies show that patent life
is essential to innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, perhaps more so than any other
inventive industry. Congress tried to address this in 1984, authorizing the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) to restore a portion of the patent term lost to premarket testing. The
PTO does not restore all of the lost time, though, which raises the question whether the U.S.
legal system may steer researchers away from drugs that take a long time to develop. This
Article focuses on that question. It examines every grant of patent term restoration for a new
drug or biologic from the scheme s 1984 enactment to April 1, 2018. Few scholars have
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considered patent term restoration from an empirical perspective, none has used a dataset of
this size and scope, and none has addressed the questions this Article addresses. Two
significant conclusions stand out. First, longer clinical programs lead to shorter effective patent
life, even after the PTO has granted patent term restoration. The results are strongly statistically
significant and contribute to a growing body of literature raising the alarm that the U.S. legal
system may be systematically skewing drug research incentives away from the harder
problems such as a cure for Al heimer s Disease and interventions at the earl stages of
cancers. Second, Congress decided to allow drug companies to apply patent term restoration
to continuation patents, specifically because this would increase the chances of reaching
fourteen years of effective patent life. Ten years later Congress changed the way patent terms
are calculated without considering the effect on patent term restoration. Selecting a
continuation patent no longer has the same effect. Today a drug company is most likely to
achieve the fourteen years of effective patent life by securing a new, original patent that issues
late in clinical trials. Policymakers and scholars complain when companies secure these laterexpiring patents, but the findings in this Article suggest those patents may be necessary to
accomplish what Congress intended in 1984.
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INTRODUCTION
New drugs are famously expensive and can remain so for years, until
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copies become available.1 Concern about their prices and the wait for
cheaper copies has sparked legislative hearings and policy proposals over
the years including, recently, suggestions that the government impose
price controls or even strip drug companies of their patent rights.2 These
proposals implicate another significant public policy challenge: that we
still lack effective treatments for many serious diseases. We have no
meaningful treatment for Al heimer s Disease, for instance, even though
ten percent of the U.S. population aged sixty-five or older has been
diagnosed with Al heimer s dementia, and the number of sufferers is
projected to reach 7.1 million by 2025.3 Many cancers such as
pancreatic cancer, diffuse intrinsic pontine glioma, and glioblastoma
multiforme remain essentially untreatable.4 And many chronic diseases,
though treated, continue to exact a toll.5 Better treatments for these
conditions are needed.
The two issues the high price of new drugs, and the need for new
drugs are intertwined. The U.S. legal system stimulates the invention
and development of new drugs in part by promising a period of exclusivity
in the market, which is attractive because it provides an opportunity to
charge higher prices during the period.6 This exclusivity is made possible
1. This Article uses new drugs to refer to both (1) new drugs approved under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), and (2) biological products that are new drugs but, because also
biological, licensed under the Public Health Service Act. See infra section I.A. It refers to both generic
drugs and biosimilar biologics as copies for convenience. See infra note 67.
2. See, e.g., Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price be Evergreen, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 590 (2018)
(proposing that drug companies be limited to one patent or period of exclusivity); Hannah Brennan et
al., A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18
YALE J.L. & TECH. 275 (2016) (arguing that the U.S. government should invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to
authorize generic manufactures to produce patented drugs, without permission of the patent owner,
subject to reasonable compensation ); S. 1416, 116th Cong. 27(b)(1) (2019) (proposing to presume
it an unfair method of competition in or affecting commerce to obtain certain additional laterexpiring patents in the same patent family or portfolio as an already issued patent that claims an
approved drug).
3. ALZHEIMER S ASS N, 2018 ALZHEIMER S DISEASE FACTS AND FIGURES 17, 22 (2018).
4. See, e.g., Ho-Shin Gwak & Hyeon Jin Park, Developing Chemotherapy for Diffuse Pontine
Intrinsic Gliomas (DIPG), 120 CRITICAL REVS. ONCOLOGY/HEMATOLOGY 111, 111 (2017) (noting
median survival rate of ten months after radiation).
5. Ten years ago, researchers at the Milken Institute estimated that seven chronic diseases cancer,
heart disease, hypertension, mental disorders, diabetes, pulmonary conditions, and stroke together
affect more than 109 million Americans, with a total impact on the economy of $1.3 trillion annually.
Ross DeVol & Armen Bedroussian, An Unhealthy America: The Economic Burden of Chronic
Disease, 24 MED. BENEFITS 1, 1 2 (2007).
6. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265
(1977); see also Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX.
L. REV. 503, 508 (2009) ( Without some wa to dela generic competition . . . pharmaceutical
companies would usually find it impossible to recoup their R&D investments and would likely invest
their money elsewhere. With strong patent protection, however, firms can expect to enjoy a lengthy
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in part by the protection of patents associated with those new drugs.7
Patent protection ensures that an inventor can enjoy a period during which
others cannot make or sell copies of the invention.8 The patent permits a
temporary high price for the resulting new drug, and it thus encourages
innovation.9 Although there is disagreement on the matter, many conclude
that we cannot have the one (the innovation, meaning the drug) without
monopol over their drugs, providing them an opportunit to profit from their investment in R&D. ).
7. It is also made possible in part by the data exclusivity provisions of the two drug approval
statutes. During the data exclusivity period, other companies may not rely in their own applications
on the research generated and submitted by an inventor to support approval of its drug. See, e.g., 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (providing that generic applications cannot be submitted until five years after
approval of a new drug with a new active ingredient, or four years in the case of a patent challenge).
There may be other ways to stimulate the invention and development of new drugs. See, e.g.,
Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003) (assessing a variety of
proposed pri e s stems in which the government pa s monetar compensation and recommending
a flexible, retrospective system administered by an administrative agency); Michael R. Kremer,
Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137, 1146 48 (1998)
(considering a mechanism in which the government offers to purchase patents at their private value,
determined using an action, adjusted by a markup to cover the difference between the patent s social
value and its private value); Aidan Hollis, An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation
9 18 (Univ. Calgary, Inst. of Health Econs., Working Paper, 2004) (proposing a system in which
innovators are rewarded by direct payment from a government-financed fund based on the
incremental therapeutic benefits of their innovation); Kristina M. Lybecker & Robert A. Freeman,
Funding Pharmaceutical Innovation Through Direct Tax Credits, 2 HEALTH ECONS. POL Y & L. 267,
270 71 (2007) (proposing as an alternative to the current patent system an approach of rewarding
innovators with direct tax credits in exchange for marginal cost pricing ); James Love & Tim
Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519,
1528 34 (2007) (recommending that the government award innovators with large prizes tied to the
actual impact of the drug on healthcare outcomes); Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription
Drug Insurance as Innovation Incentive, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153, 201 08 (2016) (proposing a
change to the government health insurance program for low-income individuals, Medicaid, to reward
innovators who bring to market drugs for diseases primarily affecting low-income populations).
8. See generally infra section I.B. There is debate in the literature about whether patents promote
not only invention (discovery) but also post-invention development efforts. Compare Kitch, supra
note 6, at 276 (arguing that early-issued patents give their owners an incentive to make investments
to maximi e the value of the patent ), with Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications
for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004) (disputing Kitch s prospect theor and
notion that a single compan is better positioned than the market to make efficient use of an idea ).
This debate does not affect the point made in the text. The point is that without the promise of a period
of exclusivity in the market, the prospect of competition will deter investment in the post-invention
research and development needed to commercialize a new drug.
9. Patent protection for new drugs has its limitations, however. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The
Shifting Functional Balance of Patents and Drug Regulation, 19 HEALTH AFFS. 119, 122 28 (2001)
(pointing out shortcomings of patent-based exclusivity for new drugs, including the possibility of
patents held by third parties for prior discoveries that may be essential to development of the drug in
question and increasing public hostility to patents due to rising health care costs); Yaniv Heled, Why
Primary Patents Covering Biologics Should Be Unenforceable Against Generic Applicants Under the
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 211 (2012) (suggesting that
patents for biologics products are vulnerable to workarounds).
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the other (the encouragement to innovate, and thus a temporarily high
price).10 What remains is the question of balancing: how much exclusivity
in the market is needed for the optimal amount of medical innovation.11
This Article focuses on the relationship between the patent incentive
and drug innovation, adding an empirical dimension relating to the length
of drug patents that has been lacking in the scholarship to date. It focuses
on the fact that the patent incentive does not work the same way for drugs
as it does for other inventions, because a separate body of federal law bars
the inventor from marketing the invention for sometimes half or even
more of the patent life. That is, federal regulator requirements distort
the patent.12
Since the early twentieth century, federal law has required the sellers
of drugs to test their products and seek the government s permission
before launching.13 A new drug must be proven safe and effective for a
particular medical use.14 Satisfying this standard entails laboratory and

10. See Roin, supra note 6, at 508 ( Although the public suffers from high prices for drugs while
they are covered by a patent, most of those drugs probably would not have been developed without
that protection. As a result, it is widely thought that the benefits of drug patents far outweigh their
costs. ); see also Kristina M.L. Acri, Economic Growth and Prosperity Stem from Effective
Intellectual Property Rights, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 865, 868 (2017) ( Without patent protection,
and other forms of intellectual propert rights to protect an innovator s investment, pharmaceutical
drug development will not take place. ); F.M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry–Prices and
Progress, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 927, 927 (2004) ( Numerous cross-industry surveys have shown
that managers of pharmaceutical research and development assign unusually great importance to
patent protection as a means of recouping their investment in research, development, and testing. ).
11. There is extensive theoretical literature analyzing optimal patent term, dating to Professor
Nordhaus s seminal work in 1969, with which this Article does not engage. WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS,
INVENTION GROWTH, AND WELFARE; A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 76
(1969) (proposing that optimal patent length balances the tradeoff between eliciting activity that
would not otherwise have occurred, on the one hand, and giving monopoly protection to inventions
that would have been shared with society anyway, on the other hand). There is less empirical literature
on the subject. See Eric Budish et al., Patents and Research Investments: Assessing the Empirical
Evidence, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 183, 183 (2016) (reviewing the surprisingl small . . . body of
empirical evidence assessing the elasticit of investment with respect to patent term length).
Recently, however, some have argued that patent terms should be tailored to field of invention or to
time to market. See, e.g., Eric Budish et al., Do Fixed Patent Terms Distort Innovation? Evidence
from Cancer Clinical Trials 1 (Stan. Inst. Econ. Pol Rsch., Discussion Paper No. 13-001, 2013),
https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/heidi.paper__6.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9WVE-W3JC] (suggesting that with fixed patent terms, research and development
is distorted awa from technologies with long time lags between invention and commerciali ation );
Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 672, 673 (2014) (arguing that time to market is a uniquel powerful indicator of the optimal
patent strength for different t pes of inventions ).
12. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669 (1990).
13. See generally infra section I.A.
14. See infra section I.A.

Acri & Lietzan (Do Not Delete)

1322

10/27/2020 4:49 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1317

animal ( preclinical ) testing as well as several phases of human
( clinical ) trials. The federal government s gatekeeping mechanism
protects public health by ensuring that new drugs are, on average, more
beneficial than harmful for the patients for whom they are intended.15 But
gatekeeping comes at a price: the research required by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) is not only expensive and time consuming,
but risky.16 The inventor must make an enormous investment, without
knowing whether the drug will succeed in trials (or for what indication,
exactly), without knowing when the trials will be completed and the drug
approved, and without knowing whether (if approved) the drug will be
commercially successful.17
Distortion of the patent term stems from the fact that drug inventors
usually file their first patent applications before they start testing in
humans.18 This generally means that the patents issue before the trials are
done and before approval of the drug. And while the premarket testing
continues, the patent life runs. By the time the federal government permits
the inventor to commercialize the invention, much of the patent term has
lapsed. The years that remain are the effective life of the patent the
years during which the inventor may lawfully exploit the invention in the
market, without others also using the invention. The irony for inventors
of new drugs is that drugs requiring more premarket investment (more
years of research) may enjoy less patent life at the end of the day.
The problem grew worse in the 1960s and 1970s as the federal
regulatory framework grew more demanding.19 In 1984, Congress
responded to this fact, and to data showing a decline in drug innovation,
with an amendment to the Patent Act.20 As a result the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) now restores a portion of the drug patent term
lost to premarket research and development and FDA review.21 But it does
not restore all of the time lost. It restores only half of the clinical testing
time (after the patent issues), and it caps the recovery at five years, no
matter how long clinical trials and FDA approval take. This means that
15. See Patricia J. Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 IND. L.J. 845, 857 (2017); see also Erika
Lietzan, Access Before Evidence and the Price of the FDA s New Drug Authorities, 53 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1243, 1249 54 (2019).
16. See infra section I.A.
17. See infra section I.A and sources cited note 54.
18. See infra section I.B.
19. See infra section I.C and sources cited note 83.
20. See infra section I.C; Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35
U.S.C.).
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 156.
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after a certain point, premarket research and development simply
translates into lost patent life. The statute also limits the patent to fourteen
years of life after drug approval, meaning that the restored patent may not
expire later than the fourteen- ear anniversar of FDA s approval of
the drug.
As a regulator matter, the length of a drug s premarket clinical
program mostly reflects factors outside the control of the company
developing the drug.22 Moreover, some types of drugs consistently take
longer in premarket research and development.23 These findings raise the
question whether given the patent term restoration formula the U.S.
legal system systematically under-encourages particular areas of
medical research.24
This Article continues that research with an expanded dataset,
examining empirically the relationship between research and
development timelines, on the one hand, and effective patent life (the time
from FDA approval to patent expiry), on the other hand. Few scholars
have considered patent term restoration from an empirical perspective,
none has used a dataset of this size and scope, and none has addressed the
questions this Article addresses.25
The dataset relates to 642 approved drugs (including biologics) for
which a patent was restored. This comprises every grant of patent term
restoration for a drug between enactment of the statute in September 1984
and April 1, 2018, when data collection ended. Four conclusions from the
22. See infra section I.A.
23. See infra section I.A.
24. One recent study found that firms under-invest in the development of cancer drugs that require
long-term trials. Eric Budish et al., Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence from
Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044, 2047 (2015).
25. The two significant empirical pieces to date differ from this Article in scope and focus. First,
in 2018, Professors Beall, Darrow, and Kesselheim published an examination of patent term
restoration for the 170 best-selling new drugs that experienced generic market entry between 2000
and 2012. Reed F. Beall et al., Patent Term Restoration for Top-Selling Drugs in the United States,
24 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 20 (2019). The Beall dataset is smaller than the dataset for this Article,
which includes all patent term restoration grants for drugs and biologics between enactment of the
statute in 1984 and April 1, 2018, and which includes additional variables discussed in Part III.
Parts III and IV discuss the findings in the Beall paper. Second, in 2014, Jaime Cárdenas-Navia
presented an analysis of all patents extended by the PTO between enactment in 1984 and December
31, 2013. Jaime F. Cardenas-Navia, Thirty Years of Flawed Incentives: An Empirical and Economic
Analysis of Hatch-Waxman Patent-Term Restoration, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1302, 1315 (2015).
This Article does not consider the Cardenas-Navia findings, because his dataset includes not only
human drugs and biologics, but also medical devices, food additives, and animal drugs. Each is subject
to a different premarket review paradigm (for instance, food additives do not go through effectiveness
testing), and the formulas governing patent term restoration differ. Several other pieces in the legal,
economic, or policy literature offer less comprehensive empirical examinations of patent term
restoration; we discuss some below, where relevant. See sources cited infra notes 146 and 150.
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analysis stand out.
First, a longer clinical period is associated with a shorter final effective
patent life (meaning after restoration), and a longer period between patent
filing and start of clinical trials is associated with a shorter final effective
patent life.26 Although the magnitude of the impact is small, the results
are strongly statistically significant, confirming the hypothesis that longer
premarket research and development programs lead to shorter effective
patent life, even with patent term restoration.
Second, application of the five-year cap on patent term restoration
makes it less likely the final effective patent life will come close to the
fourteen-year outer limit envisioned by Congress in 1984.27 Again, the
magnitude of the impact is small, but the results strongly
statistically significant.
Third, there is generally no relationship between the therapeutic
categor in which a drug falls and the drug s final effective patent life.28
Very few therapeutic category variables were statistically significant, and
the statistically significant ones explained almost none of the variation in
effective patent life.
Fourth, certain aspects of the drug patent itself play an important role
in determining its final effective patent life.29 In the 1990s Congress
changed how patent terms are calculated.30 In 1984, a patent lasted for
seventeen years from its issuance date.31 Now a patent lasts for twenty
years from its application date.32 And if the patent relates to an earlierfiled patent, the ( child ) patent term lasts for twent ears from the
earlier ( parent ) patent application date.33 In 1984 policymakers chose to
permit restoration of child patents, because these patents issued and
therefore (under the patent law at the time) expired later, and restoring
them would lead to a longer effective patent life.34 When Congress
changed the patent term in 1994, it did not consider the impact on patent
term restoration.35 And in this dataset, when the twenty-year rule applies,
26. See infra section IV.A.
27. See infra section IV.C.
28. See infra section IV.B.
29. See infra section IV.A.
30. Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 154, 108 Stat. 4809, 4983
(1994).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 154.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See infra section IV.A.
35. See infra section IV.A.

Acri & Lietzan 08 Lietzan and Acri-10-27(Do Not Delete)

2020]

DISTORTED DRUG PATENTS

10/27/2020 4:49 PM

1325

having child status decreases effective patent life the opposite of what
lawmakers intended in 1984.36
Together these findings suggest a conclusion that could have
significant policy implications. Longer premarket trials mean shorter
effective patent life but not by much. In 1984, policymakers chose to
allow drug companies to select later-issued patents for patent term
restoration. The ability to select a later-issued child patent for restoration
may have therefore mitigated the distorting effect of the premarket
regulatory regime. But Congress effectively undid the 1984 decision, ten
years later, without reflection. The change has made it important for
companies to pick later-issued original patents to achieve the same result
as intended in 1984 fourteen years of effective patent life. But these
patents generall do not cover the drug s active ingredient; the cover
other aspects of the drug. Some scholars refer to non-active-ingredient
drug patents as secondar patents though they are simply patents, like
any other and a growing body of literature criticizes these patents.37 But
policymakers selected a fourteen-year target for effective patent life target
in 1984, and the findings here suggest that later-issued and later-expiring
original patents may now be essential to hitting that target. This Article
takes no position on the optimal length of drug patents or the optimal
period of exclusivity in the market for drugs, but the findings in this
Article may have implications for scholars and policymakers who
question the need for multiple patents covering the same product.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the tension between
patent law and the drug approval framework in the United States, as well
as the patent term restoration framework enacted to partially mitigate this
tension. Part II describes the hypotheses that motivated this project.
Part III describes the dataset and findings. These comprise descriptive
statistics relating to effective patent life and the impact of patent term
restoration on effective patent life, as well as the results of a series of
regressions assessing the determinants of effective patent life. Part IV

36. See infra section IV.A.
37. Amy Kapczynski et al., Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis
of “Secondary” Pharmaceutical Patents, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2012) ( These patents are generally
termed secondary because they are assumed to come later in the sequence of innovation, and to offer
less robust protection than a chemical compound claim. We use the term not because we believe these
patents to be necessarily of lesser importance or strength, but because the term is conventional in the
literature, and among practitioners. ); C nthia M. Ho, Should All Drugs Be Patentable?: A
Comparative Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 295, 313 17 (2015) (criticizing practice of
securing secondar patents and questioning their validit ); Feldman, supra note 2, at 601
(examining and critici ing the practice of securing secondar patents, on the theor that it refreshes
the monopoly protection on a drug).
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discusses the economic and policy implications of the findings, and Part V
concludes with thoughts about policy implications.
I.

BACKGROUND

Firms considering the development of new drugs face both a distortion
of their patents and a paradox.38 Federal law stimulates scientific progress
by ensuring that innovators can enjoy a period of exclusivity in their
inventions, meaning a period during which others may not make or sell
the inventions without their permission.39 This period is made possible in
part through the protection of patents, which last for a fixed period.40 But
federal law also prohibits the sale of a new drug until the inventor has
performed years of testing in humans and persuaded the government that
the drug meets a particular regulatory standard of safety and
effectiveness.41 This takes a variable amount of time sometimes only a
few years, but sometimes a decade or more.42 This is patent distortion:
mandatory testing wastes patent life, leaving inventors of regulated
products less time (than other inventors) to commercialize their inventions
without copies in the market. So long as the patent term starts before
clinical testing ends, the longer clinical testing takes, the less patent life
remains at the time of approval. This is the paradox: if a premarket testing
program is more time-consuming, the U.S. legal system provides less of
a reward to the inventor. This part describes the process of new drug
approval, provides an overview of the patent and exclusivity incentives,
and then explains the distortion of patent life and steps Congress took in
1984 to address that distortion.
A.

New Drug and Biological Product Approval

By the time a new drug reaches patients, it has been the subject of years
of testing, as well as intense review by the FDA. Two federal statutes
38. See generally Erika Lietzan, The Drug Innovation Paradox, 83 MO. L. REV. 39 (2018).
39. See infra section I.B.
40. See infra section I.B.
41. See infra section I.A. The logistics are more complex in practice. The inventor is a natural
person. That natural person or an entity to which the person has assigned the invention (for instance,
the inventor s employer) may apply for the patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 118. In the case of a new drug, a
company (such as the inventor s employer) generally performs or pays for this testing. This company
is the drug s developer. The distinction between the natural person and the company is immaterial for
the point in the text: a drug embodying the invention cannot be sold commercially until the testing is
complete. This Article uses the term inventor to refer to the individual and the company authorized
by the inventor.
42. See infra section I.A.
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require premarket approval of new drugs: the Public Health Service Act
(PHSA) requires that biological products (or biologics ) be licensed
before they are marketed,43 and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) requires that all other drugs be approved before the are
marketed.44 This Article refers to both as drugs which they are45
unless it is important to distinguish between biological and non-biological
drugs, and it refers to the marketing authori ation decision as approval.
New drug research and development usually begins with the discovery
or creation of a molecule with useful biological activity typically shown
in tissues and in animal models.46 This molecule eventually becomes the
active moiety (the molecule responsible for the therapeutic action of the
drug) in a finished product for patients. The FDA does not approve active
moieties, however, nor does it approve based on useful biological activity.
Instead, it approves a finished product the active moiety in a formulation
with inactive ingredients, with a particular route of administration, dosage
form, and strength for specific conditions of use (a particular disease or
disease state, following a particular dosing regimen, with other relevant
instructions for use).47 The agency also approves labeling for prescribers
that describes the approved conditions of use.48 The precise medical
condition for which the drug is approved is known as the drug s
indication, and the product must be shown safe and effective for that
indication under the conditions of use described in its labeling.49
Developing the evidence of safety and effectiveness needed for
approval is a multistep process that begins with laboratory and animal
testing and proceeds through several phases of clinical trials. Trials in
humans typically start with small safety tests in healthy subjects and move
through additional phases of progressively larger trials with more
ambitious goals.50 The process typically culminates in two randomized
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(a).
44. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
45. See id. § 321(g)(1) (defining drug ).
46. See ERLAND STEVENS, MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY: THE MODERN DRUG DISCOVERY PROCESS
94 100 (1st ed. 2014); Bruce H. Littman, Translational Medicine: Definition, History, and Strategies,
in TRANSLATIONAL MEDICINE AND DRUG DISCOVERY 4 6 (Bruce H. Littman & Rajesh Krishna eds.,
2011).
47. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d); see also Lietzan, supra note 38, at 55 56.
48. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
49. Id.
50. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2019); REBECCA A. ENGLISH ET AL., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT L
ACADS., FORUM ON DRUG DISCOVERY, DEVELOPMENT, AND TRANSLATION: TRANSFORMING
CLINICAL RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES: WORKSHOP
SUMMARY 24 26 (2010).
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double-blinded controlled clinical trials, which are the gold standard for
FDA approval.51 If these trials are large enough to permit meaningful
conclusions, they can identify causal relationships proving that the drug
is effective.52 Empirical studies consistently find that for a new molecule
this process can take twelve years or more.53 The process is expensive and
the outcome uncertain.54
As a practical matter, the design and length of any particular premarket
program depends on factors over which the developer has little control:
the type of molecule at issue, its mechanism of action, the disease itself
and the biological pathways it uses, the specific disease state targeted, the
therapeutic outcome tested, and even the presence and nature of other
51. See Vinay Prasad & Vance Berger, Hard-Wired Bias: How Even Double-Blind, Randomized
Controlled Trials Can Be Skewed from the Start, 90 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1171 (2015) ( Welldesigned, adequately-powered randomized controlled trials . . . are rightfully considered the highest
form of evidence on which to base treatment and diagnostic decisions, minimizing potential biases,
particularl confounding, that plague nonrandomi ed evidence. ). Double blinding means neither the
patients nor the investigators know the assignments. Randomization and double blinding reduce the
potential for both bias and confounding (unaccounted-for variables that are actually responsible for
the outcome). See Thomas R. Frieden, Evidence for Health Decision Making—Beyond Randomized,
Controlled Trials, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 465, 466 71 (2017); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2019)
(describing the design characteristics of an adequate and well-controlled trial); U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., FDA-1999-D-1874, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CHOICE OF CONTROL GROUP AND RELATED
ISSUES IN CLINICAL TRIALS (2001) (describing nature and purpose of randomization, controls, and
double-blinding).
52. See Frieden, supra note 51, at 470. Smaller trials usually have wider confidence intervals
around effectiveness meaning that the true value (actual effectiveness) could be anywhere within a
larger range of numbers. See id.
53. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Trends in Risks Associated with New Drug Development: Success
Rates for Investigational Drugs, 87 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 272 (2010) (noting
that analyses across all therapeutic areas indicate that the development of a new drug, from target
identification through approval for marketing, takes over twelve years and often much longer).
54. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D
Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20 (2016) (estimating average out-of-pocket cost per approved compound
of $1.4 billion and total preapproval cost of $2.56 billion); Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data
Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 91, 107 08 (2016) (discussing range of estimates for the
length of time and cost of developing a new drug); Chi Heem Wong et al., Estimation of Clinical
Trial Success Rates and Related Parameters, 20 BIOSTATISTICS 273, 277 (2019) (examining over
21,000 compounds in trials between January 1, 2000, and October 31, 2015, and finding that only
13.8% of all drug development programs eventually lead to approval); Katarzyna Smietana et al.,
Trends in Clinical Success Rates, 15 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 379, 380 (2016) (examining
approvals in 2012-2014 and finding that small molecule drugs had only a 9% chance of making it
from initial trials to commercial launch, and biological drugs an 18% chance); Helen Dowden &
Jamie Munro, Trends in Clinical Success Rates and Therapeutic Focus, 18 NATURE REVS. DRUG
DISCOVERY 495, 495 (2019) (using data from 2015 to 2017 and finding the probability of launch from
the start of clinical trials to be less than 10%); GOV T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-49, NEW
DRUG DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE, BUSINESS, REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES
CITED AS HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 25 (2006) (noting that clinical trial failure rates
increased to 91% during the period 2000 through 2003).
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treatments on the market.55 The developer has general choices such as
whether to proceed and (perhaps) which of several potential indications
to pursue (or pursue first) but much of the rest will be dictated by
science, regulator requirements, or the FDA s policies and preferences.56
Certain therapeutic categories are, however, consistently associated with
longer premarket clinical programs. One recent article examining 570 new
drug applications (for non-biologic drugs) approved between August 1984
and August 2016 found that antipsychotics, central nervous system
agents, antidepressants, anticonvulsants, anti-Parkinson s agents,
immunological agents, blood products, antiemetics, and antineoplastic
agents were associated with longer clinical programs than non-biologic
drugs in other therapeutic categories.57
B.

Patenting New Drugs and Biologics

The primary incentive to discover and develop a new drug in the United
States is the prospect of a period for exclusive marketing sales without
competition from copycat products.58 Several features of federal law make

55. See Lietzan, supra note 38, at 62 77.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 101 02. The drugs in these therapeutic categories had average clinical testing periods
exceeding the overall average of the dataset (5.96 years). See id. at 88; see also Erika Lietzan &
Kristina M.L. Acri, The Innovation Paradox: Pharmaceutical Marketing Exclusivity and Incentives
for Drug Development, 10 J. PHARM. HEALTH SERVS. RSCH. 169 (2019) (discussing same results);
TUFTS CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEV., CNS DRUGS TAKE LONGER TO DEVELOP AND HAVE
LOWER SUCCESS RATES THAN OTHER DRUGS 1 (2014) (finding that mean clinical development time
for CNS drugs between 1999 and 2013 was 12.8 months, or 18%, longer than the mean time for other
drugs); Joseph A. DiMasi et al., R&D Costs and Returns by Therapeutic Category, 38 DRUG INFO. J.
211, 217 (2004) (finding that the mean overall time from the initiation of clinical testing to marketing
approval is 32% below average for analgesic/anesthetic drugs, 30% below average for antiinfective
drugs, 9% below average for cardiovascular drugs, and 27% above average for [central nervous
s stem] drugs ).
58. See sources cited supra note 6; see also Kristina M.L. Acri, Economic Growth and Prosperity
Stems from Effective Intellectual Property Rights, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 865, 868 (2017) ( Without
patent protection, and other forms of intellectual propert rights to protect an innovator s investment,
pharmaceutical drug development will not take place. ); id. at 868 n.9 (listing scholars who have
demonstrated that patents foster ex ante innovation, motivating the investment of time and talent
because of the prospect of financial gain from those endeavors ); Fabian Gaessler & Stefan Wagner,
Patents, Data Exclusivity, and the Development of New Drugs, 2018 ACAD. OF MGMT. PROC. 3 (2019)
( Our . . . regression results indicate that a reduction in the overall duration of market exclusivity
significantly affects project outcomes. In fact, we find that the loss of one year of market exclusivity
lowers the likelihood of drug approval by about 3.5% relative to an unconditional approval rate of
30.5%. ); Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Determinants of Market Exclusivity for Prescription Drugs in
the United States, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1658, 1659 (2017) ( In the pharmaceutical market,
patents are considered essential to provide sufficient return on investment in drug development, which
can take man ears. ).
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this period of exclusive sales possible, one of which is the protection of
patents associated with the drug.
Federal law permits a patent to issue for any new and useful, nonobvious invention.59 An inventor submits a patent application to the PTO
for examination, and after the examination process which may include
communications between the applicant and examiner as well as
amendments to the patent claims the PTO will either issue or reject the
patent (in whole or in part).60 Sometimes however, the applicant will file
another application relating to the same invention, citing the same subject
matter (a continuation application) or adding new subject matter (a
continuation-in-part application).61 In this Article, consistent with
conventions in patent law, we refer to these two types of applications as
parent (or original) applications and child applications and the resulting
patents as parent (or original) patents, and child patents. In other
situations, the patent examiner may conclude that the application
describes more than one invention and may require that the applicant
select only one to prosecute; in this case, the applicant may place the other
inventions in separate divisional applications.62 We refer to these, also,
as child applications and the resulting patents as child patents.
A new drug product may encompass several patentable inventions.
These usuall include the product s active ingredient, which is the
component intended to furnish the product s pharmacological activity or
direct effects.63 The active ingredient patent is the most important patent
for the inventor, because it usually aligns with the regulatory requirements
governing approval of copies. That is, a competitor may file an
abbreviated application for a generic copy of a non-biological drug,
provided the application shows the generic drug s active ingredient is the
same.64 An abbreviated application omits the safety and effectiveness data
59. See 35 U.S.C. § 101. Various other conditions must be satisfied for a patent to issue. See, e.g.,
id. § 112 (written description requirement).
60. See id. § 132.
61. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., R-10.2019, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
201.07 201.09 (2020). Continuation and continuation-in-part applications can respond to new
information that became available after the original filing. See id. For instance, a continuation
application may make new claims, based on the disclosure in the original application. A continuationin-part application may add subject matter and make new claims, which might be desirable if the
inventor changed the invention after filing the original application.
62. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., R-10.2019, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
201.06 (2020). Divisional applications are limited to the subject matter disclosed in the parent
application. See id.
63. 21 C.F.R. § 314.3 (2019).
64. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (authorizing submission of an abbreviated new drug application
(ANDA)).
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that the inventor was required to include, and it is correspondingly faster
to prepare and much cheaper perhaps a few million dollars, compared
with the one or two billion spent by the inventor.65 But the generic
pathway is available only if the active ingredient is the same, so the active
ingredient patent generally is key to ensuring a period without generic
competition.66 So too with biosimilar copies of biologics.67 The applicant
must show that its product is highl similar to the inventor s product,68
which requires a comparative showing at the active ingredient level and
usually implicates the active ingredient patent.69
Conventional wisdom holds that firms developing drug products
should file their active ingredient patents before they begin testing any
formulation of the active ingredient in humans.70 Various doctrines of
patent law provide a strong incentive to file this application as early as
possible.71 Patent law also permits early filing; the law requires proof of
utilit which, for a drug, can ordinaril be shown with evidence from
laboratory and animal testing.72 Empirical research suggests that the
65. See FED. TRADE COMM N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG
COMPETITION iii (2019) (noting that cost of developing a generic drug is $1 5 million).
66. The drug statute also permits semi-abbreviated applications for drugs that have different active
ingredients from their reference products. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2). However, these are not
generic copies, and they are beyond the scope of this Article.
67. Although the drug statute requires a generic drug to have the same active ingredient as the
innovative product on which it is based, the biologics statute permits a biosimilar biologic to be simply
highl similar with minor differences in clinicall inactive components. Compare 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2) (drugs), with 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (biologics). This Article refers to both generic drugs and
biosimilar biologics as copies for convenience.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i), (k).
69. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA-2011-D-0605, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SCIENTIFIC
CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILARITY TO A REFERENCE PRODUCT 9 10 (2015).
70. See, e.g., Roin, supra note 6, at 539 (stating that [p]harmaceutical patents are t picall filed
when drugs are in earl preclinical research ); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in
Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 348 (2007) (noting that applications
for composition of matter patents are filed before clinical testing of a molecule begins).
71. For example, a patent will generally be denied if the invention was in public use for more than
a year before the patent application was filed. See 35 U.S.C. § 102.
72. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., R-10.2019, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
2107.03 (2020) (requiring evidence that reasonabl supports pharmacological or therapeutic utilit
and noting that data from in vitro or animal testing is generall sufficient ); see also Nelson v.
Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (finding utility based on data showing pharmacodynamic
activity in animals, specifically, stimulating smooth muscle tissue in gerbils and modulating blood
pressure in rats); Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding utility on basis of in
vitro demonstration of the claimed biological activity preventing aggregation of platelets); In re
Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ( Our court s predecessor has determined that proof of
an alleged pharmaceutical property for a compound by statistically significant tests with standard
experimental animals is sufficient to establish utility . . . the [Krimmel] [C]ourt[ s] . . . firm
conviction [was] that one who has taught the public that a compound exhibits some desirable
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earliest patent filing for new drugs occurs well before the first
human trials.73
In addition to an active ingredient patent, a drug s developer might hold
a patent claiming the formulation or composition of the finished product,
meaning the particular combination of active and inactive ingredients.74 It
might hold a patent claiming a particular dosage form and dosage of the
active ingredient or formulation.75 Other possibilities include a patent
claiming a method of using or administering the product, a patent claiming
the manufacturing process, and a patent claiming a metabolite of the
active ingredient.76 These patents may relate back to and reference the
earlier application, and some could even be continuation or continuationin-part patents. But it is also possible for a drug s developer to hold a new
patent claiming another invention relating to the drug, which it sought
during the premarket research program and which does not relate back to
an earlier application.
C.

Patent Term Distortion

In 1962, Congress amended the FDCA to require that firms obtain
preapproval of their new drugs and to require that their applications
include proof of effectiveness (in addition to safety, which the statute had
already required).77 The FDA s expectations about the content and scope
of marketing applications grew more rigorous over the decades that
followed.78 The period from the first test in humans to the first commercial
sale expanded, with predictable result: the amount of patent life

pharmaceutical property in a standard experimental animal has made a significant and useful
contribution to the art, even though it may eventually appear that the compound is without value in
the treatment in humans. (quoting In re Krimmel, 292 F.2d 948, 953 (C.C.P.A. 1961))).
73. See Lietzan, supra note 38, at 86 (examining 570 new drug applications approved between
August 1984 and August 2016 and finding an average gap of 5.61 years between (1) the date of filing
of the earliest-filed patent covering the drug or a method of using the drug and (2) the date FDA
permitted clinical trials to begin); Michael K. Dunn, Timing of Patent Filing and Market Exclusivity,
10 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 487, 488 (2011) (examining the relationship between initial
filing date of the earliest patent application and final effective patent life, which the author refers to
as market exclusivity, and illustrating that the initial patent filing date is consistently before the start
of clinical trials).
74. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2019). An inactive ingredient is any component other than the active
ingredient, such as an excipient, preservative, solvent, buffer, or coating. See id. § 314.3.
75. See id. § 314.53(b).
76. See id. See generally JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 38 46 (2005) (listing
various types of drug patent claims).
77. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 103, 76 Stat. 780, 783 (1962).
78. See Lietzan, supra note 38, at 52 54.
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remaining, by the time companies launched their drugs, grew shorter.79
These remaining ears are the effective life of the patent the years
during which the inventor may lawfully exploit the invention in the
market, without others also selling the invention.
As noted, a drug inventor usually files the first patent application before
starting clinical trials, which would generally lead to patent issuance at
the beginning of (or during) clinical trials.80 During these decades, and
indeed until the mid-1990s, a patent lasted for seventeen years from
issuance.81 As clinical programs grew longer, the effective life of this
patent therefore grew shorter, effectively distorting the patent. If the
patent applicant filed a continuation or continuation-in-part application,
the patent might issue later in time and thus expire later, but so long as the
patent issued during the premarket program, some portion of the term
would be sacrificed.82 Economic studies in the 1970s and early 1980s
showed that drug effective patent life had plummeted since the 1962
amendments.83 Concern about the diminishing effective patent life,
combined with studies finding a decline in the rate of new drug
introductions over the same years, led to proposals that lost patent life be
restored to inventors after drug approval.84
D.

Patent Term Restoration

In 1984, these proposals bore fruit with the enactment of section 156
of the Patent Act, part of a broader piece of legislation that also created a
statutory pathway for approval of generic drug applications.85 The basic
79. See Erika Lietzan, The History and Political Economy of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, 49
SETON HALL L. REV. 53, 68 (2018).
80. See sources cited supra note 73; see also F. M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological
Progress in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 100 (1993) (noting that patents on
new drug chemical entities were t picall obtained at about the time when clinical testing began
when section 156 was enacted).
81. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982); see discussion infra Part II.
82. See Lietzan, supra note 79, at 65.
83. See, e.g., DAVID SCHWARTZMAN, INNOVATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 173
(1976) (finding that average effective patent life for new drugs had dropped to 13.9 years by the late
1960s and that it dropped to 12.4 years by the early 1970s); Martin M. Eisman & William M. Wardell,
The Decline in Effective Patent Life of New Drugs, 24 RSCH. MGMT. 18, 20 (1981) (finding that
average effective patent life dropped to 9.5 years by 1979); Peter Barton Hutt, The Importance of
Patent Term Restoration to Pharmaceutical Innovation, 1 HEALTH AFFS. 6, 16 17 (1982) (discussing
other studies); Leonard G. Schifrin, Lessons from the Drug Lag: A Retrospective Analysis of the 1962
Drug Regulations, 5 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL Y 91, 102 09 (1982) (discussing other studies). See
generally Lietzan, supra note 79, at 66 68.
84. See Lietzan, supra note 79, at 70 71, 77.
85. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
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approach of section 156 has not changed since 1984. It permits extension
of a patent claiming a drug, a method of using the drug, or a method of
manufacturing the drug, if the drug was subject to a regulator review
period before commercial marketing or use.86 Put more simply,
restoration is available for a patent claiming a drug product that went
through premarket approval.
The PTO will restore a patent subject to three conditions. First, the PTO
must deny patent term restoration if the FDA has already approved the
active ingredient (or its salt or ester) pursuant to another application filed
under the same FDA approval provision.87 If the patent proposed for
restoration claims a method of manufacturing a product using
recombinant DNA technology, however, the regulatory review period
must represent the first commercial marketing of a product manufactured
using the process.88 Second, the PTO may extend only one patent for each
regulatory review period.89 In practice this means one patent for each
approved marketing application. This does not, however, mean one patent
for each new active ingredient. The FDA sometimes requires companies
to submit separate marketing applications at the same time for a single
new active ingredient.90 If the FDA approves these marketing applications
Stat. 1585 (1984).
86. 35 U.S.C. § 156(a). For a drug, the regulator review period is the period combining (1) the
clinical testing period, which begins when FDA authorizes clinical trials by permitting an
investigational new drug application (IND) to go into effect and which ends when the company
submits its new drug application (NDA) or biologics license application (BLA), and (2) the approval
period, which begins when the company submits its NDA or BLA to FDA and ends when FDA
approves that application. See id. § 156(g).
87. The permission for commercial marketing after the regulatory review period must be the first
permitted commercial marketing of the product under the provision of law under which the
regulatory review period occurred. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(5)(A). The term product means the
active ingredient . . . including an salt or ester of the active ingredient. Id. § 156(f)(1), (2). The
statute does not define active ingredient, however, and the PTO s approach to the term has changed.
In 2010 the Federal Circuit rejected the PTO s approach of considering whether FDA had previousl
approved any drug containing the same underlying active moiety, See Photocure ASA v. Kappos, 603
F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and the PTO has since focused on whether FDA has approved a
drug with the same active ingredient. At FDA, the active moiet is the molecule responsible for the
physiological or pharmacological action of the drug, while the active ingredient is the substance
introduced to the body. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a) (2019); Abbott Labs v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
88. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(5)(B).
89. Id. § 156(c)(4).
90. For example, FDA requires separate marketing applications for different dosage forms and for
different routes of administration. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA-2001-D-0134, GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY, SUBMITTING SEPARATE MARKETING APPLICATIONS AND CLINICAL DATA FOR
PURPOSES OF ASSESSING USER FEES 3 (2004). Also, FDA sometimes splits marketing applications
by indication, typically so that different review divisions can review the indications.
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on the same day, the PTO will extend a patent for each application. Third,
the PTO may extend a patent only if it has not already extended the patent
under section 156 (for instance in connection with a different drug).91
Beyond these three substantive conditions, the PTO imposes several
procedural requirements on applicants.92
The PTO does not restore all days lost to premarket research and
development. Patent life lost to animal and laboratory testing for FDA
purposes is not recoverable, even if these studies involve far more than
would be needed to secure a patent. Instead, the PTO restores the days lost
to clinical testing and FDA review of the marketing application, subject
to five limitations which it applies in the order that follows. First, the PTO
does not restore any portion of the regulatory review period before patent
issuance.93 Second, the PTO does not restore any portion of the regulatory
review period during which the applicant did not act with due diligence.94
Third, it restores only half of the testing period after patent issuance.95 The
PTO restores every day of the approval period. Fourth, it restores no more
than five years.96 There is a different cap for a patent issued before
enactment (September 24, 1984) if the product was already in clinical
trials but not approved on that date.97 For these pipeline drugs, the
PTO restores no more than two years.98 Finally, the effective patent life

91. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(2), (c)(4). Interim extensions, discussed in the text, do not count.
92. For instance, the patent owner must submit its request within sixty days of FDA approval. Id.
§ 156(d). As a result of a court ruling in 2010 and a legislative change in 2011, the PTO counts every
calendar day beginning on the first business day after FDA approval. See Meds. Co. v. Kappos, 731
F. Supp. 2d 470 (E.D. Va. 2010) (requiring PTO to use a business day counting approach, meaning
that the sixty days would begin on the first business day after FDA approval if that approved did not
occur on a business day); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(adopting a business counting approach); 35 U.S.C. § 156(d). A statutory change in 2015 changed the
deadline for controlled substances subject to scheduling decisions: the deadline is sixty days after
FDA approval or issuance of an interim final rule scheduling the drug, whichever is later. Improving
Regulatory Transparency for New Medical Therapies Act, Pub. L. No. 114-89, 129 Stat. 698 (2015);
35 U.S.C. § 156(i).
93. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(c).
94. See id. § 156(c)(1). As of April 1, 2018, FDA had never adjusted its calculation of the regulatory
review period after finding the patentee failed to act with due diligence. One applicant for patent term
restoration admitted a lack of due diligence for 935 days, during which the IND (investigational new
drug application) was inactive. The PTO subtracted these days from the testing phase. See Corrected
Notice of Final Determination, In re Patent Term Extension Application for U.S. Patent
No. 5,681,814, FDA Docket No. 2006E-0025 (Pat. & Trademark Off. Apr. 18, 2007) (corrected
notice of final determination).
95. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(2).
96. Id. § 156(g)(6).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 156(g)(6)(C).
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after patent term restoration may not exceed fourteen years.99 Put another
way, the expiry date of the restored patent must be no later than the
fourteen- ear anniversar
of the FDA s approval of the
marketing application.
In 1993, Congress amended the statute to permit two types of interim
grants of patent term restoration, which tide a patentee over until FDA
approval of the marketing application and the PTO s decision on the
patent term restoration request.100 First, subsection (d)(5) authorizes oneyear interim extensions if the FDA approval process would extend past
patent expiry.101 The PTO will not issue a (d)(5) extension, however,
unless the FDA has already accepted the marketing application.102 A
(d)(5) interim extension ends sixty days after marketing approval, which
coincides with the deadline to apply for ordinary (non-interim) patent term
restoration.103 Second, subsection (e)(2) authorizes one-year interim
extensions after FDA approval, while the PTO considers the request for
restoration.104 The PTO will grant an (e)(2) extension without consulting
the FDA to determine whether the drug satisfies the eligibility
standards.105 With one exception, the total patent term extension including
99. Id. § 156(c)(3).
100. Patent and Trademark Office Authorization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103 179, 107 Stat. 2040
(1993). This law took effect on December 3, 1993. Although subsection (e)(2) took effect in
December 1993, the PTO s regulations already provided for one-year interim extensions when a
complete PTR application had been submitted but the PTO s decision had not been issued. See Rules
for Patent Extension, 52 Fed. Reg. 9386, 9391 (Mar. 24, 1987) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1)
(explaining 7 C.F.R. § 1.760 (1987)).
101. 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(5).
102. See Final Decision Regarding Interim Patent Extension Application Under 35 U.S.C.
§ 156(d)(5), In re Patent Term Extension Application for U.S. Patent No. RE41209, FDA Docket
No. 2016-E (Pat. & Trademark Off. Feb. 4, 2016). The PTO reasons that the statute requires this, by
stating that the applicant for patent term restoration must reasonably expect that the approval process
that began for the product will extend past patent expiry. See id.
103. 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(5)(E).
104. Id. § 156(e)(2).
105. In one case, after granting two interim extensions, the PTO denied restoration on eligibility
grounds and rescinded the second interim extension. Initially, Johnson & Johnson (J&J) received two
(e)(2) interim extensions for Vusion (miconazole nitrate, white petrolatum, and zinc oxide). The
company had put forward a plausible argument that it was entitled to patent term restoration: zinc
oxide had reached the market under an earlier version of section 505 of the FDCA that did not require
premarket approval and did not involve proving effectiveness. See Response to Order to Show Cause
at 2, In re Patent of Charles E. Clum, U.S. Patent No. 4,911,932 (filed Feb. 11, 1985) (issued Mar.
27, 1990). But more than 20 years earlier, the PTO had rejected identical reasoning in a matter
involving a different drug concluding that marketing ammonium lactate under an NDA submitted
under this earlier version of section 505 constituted relevant commercial marketing under section 156.
And in the earlier matter, a federal court had rejected the patent owner s court challenge, deferring to
the PTO. Westwood Pharms., Inc. v. Quigg, No. 88 2198, 1989 WL 205631, at *3 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
In the end, despite initially granting J&J two interim extensions, the PTO concluded that the earlier
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interim extensions cannot exceed the extension for which the patentee
would be eligible under section 156.106 The exception is this: a pipeline
drug is entitled to two years of effective patent life from the date of
marketing approval regardless of any interims received.107
E.

Summation

In short, then, federal law requires the sellers of new drugs to test their
drugs and seek approval before launching. This process is not only
expensive and risky but time consuming, and the seller has surprisingly
little control over the length of time it takes. Society encourages the
investment in question by promising patents for the associated inventions
and, more precisely, by promising each invention a period of patent-based
exclusivity in the market. New drugs may be associated with a variety of
inventions, including most importantly a new and useful active
ingredient. But drug inventors usually file their first patent applications
before they start testing their drugs in humans, which means that much of
the patent term elapses before the government permits them to launch.
Congress responded to this by enacting patent term restoration in 1984,
but the PTO restores only half of the patent life lost to clinical testing, and
it cannot restore more than five years, no matter how long testing takes.
II.

HYPOTHESES

The discussion in Part I provided the basis for several hypotheses, as
follows. Without patent term restoration, longer premarket research and
development programs should distort drug patents leading to shorter
effective patent life. And certain therapeutic categories should be
associated with shorter effective patent life. Further, because the Patent
Act does not restore every day of patent life lost to premarket research and
development, this distortion should still be evident after the PTO extends
the patent term. Restoring only 50% of the days spent in clinical trials
should preserve the distortion, because the patent owner will continue to
lose days of patent life in proportion to the length of its clinical program.
The five-year cap should have a more dramatic impact: once a clinical
program reaches a certain length, more testing should simply translate to
precedent controlled. Denial of Patent Term Extension Application at 1 2, In re Patent Term
Extension Application for U.S. Patent No. 4,911,932, FDA Docket No. 2007E-0035 (Pat. &
Trademark Off. Mar. 19, 2009). Thus, it concluded that Vusion did not represent the first permitted
commercial marketing of miconazole nitrate or zinc oxide and that the patent did not claim white
petrolatum, vacated the second interim extension, and denied patent term restoration. Id. at 2.
106. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.760, 1.790(a) (2019).
107. 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(5)(E)(ii).

Acri & Lietzan (Do Not Delete)

1338

10/27/2020 4:49 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1317

lost patent life just as was the case before Congress enacted section 156.
Hitting the five- ear cap should mean a drug s final effective patent life
will be shorter and less likely to reach fourteen years.
Drugs with longer clinical programs, and drugs with longer overall
premarket research and development programs, should be associated with
application of the five-year cap. These drugs should be less likely to reach
the fourteen-year maximum effective patent life, and they should be
associated with a shorter final effective patent life. And some therapeutic
categories those associated with longer average clinical programs
should be associated with application of the five-year cap. These drugs
should be less likely to reach the fourteen-year limit, and they should be
associated with a shorter final effective patent life.
The 1994 change in the patent law leads to another hypothesis, but
explaining the hypothesis requires a more detailed explanation of how the
change was implemented. As already noted, in 1984 a patent lasted for
seventeen years from issuance.108 In the Uruguay Rounds Agreement Act
(URAA), Congress revised section 154 of the Patent Act, which governs
the patent term.109 For patents issued on applications filed on or after June
8, 1995, the term is twenty years from the patent application or, if the
application refers to an earlier-filed application, twenty years from the
date of that application.110 Put another way, a child application expires
twenty years after its parent application was filed. Complicating things
further, patents in force on June 8, 1995, or that issued on applications
filed before that date, received the benefit of this change in the law.111 In
other words, these transitional patents lasted either twent ears from
application or seventeen years from issuance, whichever ended later.112
The new calculation was more favorable if the PTO had issued the patent
in fewer than thirty-six months and there were no earlier-filed
applications. In these cases, the new calculation led to a revision of the
expiration date in what came to be known as the URAA extension.
The relationship between the URAA extension and patent term
restoration was briefly muddled. On June 7, 1995, the PTO announced
that patentees would enjoy either the URAA extension or patent term
108. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
109. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), Pub. L. No. 103 465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4983
(1994). This statute implemented the Marrakesh Agreement of 1984, itself part of the negotiations
that transformed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Id. § 2, 108 Stat. at 4813 14.
110. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
111. Id. § 154(c)(1).
112. Id.
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restoration whichever was longer but not both.113 On October 16 of
the same year, however, the Eastern District of Virginia ruled that a
patentee was entitled to both.114 And then on April 4, 1996, the Federal
Circuit took a different position.115 The owners of patents in force on June
8, 1995, were entitled to add patent term restoration to a twenty-year
patent term, even if the PTO had already calculated restoration and issued
a certificate.116 If, however, the patent was in force on June 8, 1995, only
because of patent term restoration i.e., it was then enjoying its restored
days the URAA extension was unavailable.117 The PTO had been
restoring patents all the while, and eventually restorations had to be
recalculated to conform to the Federal Circuit ruling.
Drugs approved in the thirty-five years since enactment of section 156
have been protected by patents subject to three different patent term
regimes: the pre-URAA regime in which patents lasted for seventeen
years from issuance, the post-URAA regime in which patents lasted for
twenty years from application or parent application, and the transition
regime.118 And most drugs were protected by more than one patent.119 For
any particular drug, these patents may have varied in scope (for example,
active ingredient versus formulation) as well as type (child versus parent)
and term (seventeen years from issuance versus twenty years from
application). And the drug company could select any one of these patents
for restoration. Because the PTO will restore only a portion of the clinical

113. Patent Term Extensions Under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act and Their Effects on
Marketing Applications for Human and Animal Drug Products, 60 Fed. Reg. 30309 (June 8, 1995).
114. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 903 F. Supp. 964, 964 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff d in part and rev d in
part, 80 F.3d 1543, 1544 (4th Cir. 1996).
115. Kessler, 80 F.3d at 1544.
116. 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1).
117. Kessler, 80 F.3d at 1550.
118. This is an oversimplification. In 1994 and again in 1999, Congress also enacted patent term
adjustment to provide relief for the shortening of effective patent life stemming from delays at the
PTO. First, as part of the URAA, Congress provided for adjustment of the patent term to compensate
for delay because of an interference proceeding, secrecy order, or appellate review of an adverse
decision on patentability. 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (2000). This adjustment applied to patent applications
filed on or after June 8, 1995, and before May 29, 2000. 21 C.F.R. § 1.701(e) (2019). Second, in 1999,
Congress provided for automatic adjustment of the patent term to compensate for more routine delays
at the PTO. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4402, 113 Stat.
1501A-552, at 1501A-557 to 1501A-560 (1999). Section 154(b) now states various deadlines for
stages in the patent prosecution such as three years for completion of the entire process (subject to
various exceptions) and generally requires a day of adjustment for each day of delay beyond the
stated deadlines. 35 U.S.C. § 154(b). This scheme applies to patent applications filed after May 29,
2000. § 4405(a), 113 Stat. at 1501A-560.
119. Patents issued after approval would not be among them (unless they were issued immediately
after approval). A company must request patent term restoration within sixty days of receiving FDA
approval. 35 U.S.C. § 156(d); see discussion supra note 92.
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trial period after patent issuance, selecting a child patent subject to a
seventeen-year term should be associated with longer final effective
patent life but restoring a child patent subject to a twenty-year term should
be associated with shorter final effective patent life, as follows.
Restoring a child patent should be associated with longer final effective
patent life if that patent is subject to the seventeen-year patent term. Under
this regime, if a company filed its application later, the resulting patent
would generally issue later and therefore have a later expiry date. Because
the PTO will restore only the portion of the clinical trial period after patent
issuance, less of the clinical period would be eligible for restoration. But
the smaller number of restoration days would be added to a later expiry
date. Because the PTO restores only 50% of the time spent in trials, a
restored later-issuing child seventeen-year patent would expire later than
a restored earlier-issuing parent seventeen-year patent.
Conversely, restoring a child patent should be associated with a shorter
final effective patent life if that patent is subject to the twenty-year patent
term. Under this regime, if a company files its application later, the
resulting patent will generally issue later but it will not have a later
expiry date. The expiry date is now keyed to the date of the parent
application. As before, the PTO will restore only the portion of the clinical
period after patent issuance, so less of the clinical period is eligible for
restoration. But in this case, the PTO will not be adding this smaller
number to a later expiry date. This leads to the final hypothesis: restoring
a child patent should be associated with longer effective patent life if the
seventeen-year patent term applies, but not if the twenty-year
term applies.
Part III explores these questions examining all 642 drug (including
biologic) patent term restoration grants from enactment of the HatchWaxman Amendments on September 24, 1984, through April 1, 2018.
III. FINDINGS
This Part describes our findings. It first describes how our dataset was
assembled and what the dataset contains. Next, it offers descriptive
statistics using the dataset to describe average clinical program length,
for example, as well as average effective patent life before patent term
restoration, and the impact of patent term restoration. Finally, it explores
whether longer premarket research programs lead to shorter effective
patent life, by using a series of regressions to explore the determinants of
effective patent life.

Acri & Lietzan 08 Lietzan and Acri-10-27(Do Not Delete)

2020]
A.

10/27/2020 4:49 PM

DISTORTED DRUG PATENTS

1341

Dataset and Methodology
The dataset used in this Article was generated as follows.

1.

Generating the Dataset of 642 Drugs

First, the PTO provided a spreadsheet of all patent term restoration
applications received between September 28, 1984, and April 1, 2017.120
The PTO also maintains a table of patent term restoration grants on its
website.121 Neither list is complete, so the lists were combined, and
duplicates removed.122 Although some PTR applications could have been
omitted from both sources, the Federal Register was used to confirm that
the PTO restored no other drug or biologic patent in the interval studied.
The PTO cannot restore a patent until the FDA has published the
regulatory review period in the Federal Register. Second, drugs and
biologics were extracted for analysis. Section 156 authorizes patent term
restoration for other regulated products: food additives, color additives,
animal drugs, and veterinary biologics. These were excluded.123
Third, we extracted the drugs and biologics for which the PTO granted
patent term restoration before April 1, 2018.124 In a handful of instances,
120. Email from Mary Till, Legal Advisor, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., to Erika Lietzan, Assoc.
Professor, Univ. of Mo. Sch. of L., and Kristina M.L. Acri née Lybecker, Assoc. Professor & Dept.
Chair, Dept. of Econ. & Bus., Colo. Coll. (Apr. 2017) (on file with authors) (containing a Patent Term
Restoration Application Spreadsheet).
121. Patent Terms Extended Under 35 U.S.C. § 156, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/patent-term-extension/patent-terms-extendedunder-35-usc-156 [https://perma.cc/3DWP-E4TS].
122. For instance, the spreadsheet omitted but the table included Atrovent (ipratropium
bromide). The table omitted but the spreadsheet included more than fifty new drugs with restored
patents, including Savella (milnacipran hydrochloride), Potiga (ezogabine), and Myfortic
(mycophenolic acid).
123. The PTO s spreadsheet classified the products, but some products were misclassified. For
instance, the PTO lists Lac-Hydrin (ammonium lactate) and Nix (permethrin) as medical devices,
although FDA approved them under new drug applications. The PTO lists Luveris (lutropin alfa),
Lantus (insulin glargine recombinant), Novolog (insulin aspart recombinant), Increlex (mecasermin
recombinant), Iplex (mecasermin rinfabate recombinant), and Omontys (peginesatide acetate) as
biologics, but FDA approved them under new drug applications. We categorized the products in the
spreadsheet manually based on the regulatory review provisions new drug approval, biologics
license approval, medical device approval or clearance, new animal drug approval, or food additive
petition that would have been applied by FDA.
124. In most cases, we examined the PTO s notice of final determination and the patent extension
certificate, found in the Image File Wrapper available through the PTO s Public Patent Application
Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. PAIR was missing the relevant documents for some patents. In
these cases, we relied on other sources of information. For instance, the PTO list of patent terms
extended includes links to some certificates. Some notices of final determination are available through
Westlaw, and others can be found through hyperlinks in a PTO list of notices mailed after November
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the FDA approved more than one marketing application for the same
active ingredient on the same day, which allowed the PTO to extend more
than one patent.125 In these situations, the lower-numbered (and thus
earlier-filed) marketing application was extracted for analysis; the highernumbered application was omitted. If a patent owner enjoyed interim
extensions that ultimately equaled the number of days sought, we treated
the restoration as granted even if the PTO never ruled on the restoration
request.126 If the company ultimately received zero days of extension
because the effective patent life already exceeded fourteen years we
treated the restoration as denied.127
Finally, we excluded drugs for which no investigational new drug
application (IND) ever took effect. Federal law requires an IND for
clinical trials if the drug in question will be shipped in interstate
commerce.128 The lack of an IND means the company performed its
clinical trials overseas. These drugs were omitted from the dataset because
the clinical trial period for purposes of patent term restoration begins on
the IND effective date and was, therefore, zero days for these products
not a factually correct representation of the number of days spent in
clinical testing.

1, 1996, and January 1, 2005. Patent Term Extension (Restoration) under 35 U.S.C. § 156
Decisions Commissioner
for
Patents,
U.S.
PAT.
&
TRADEMARK
OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/foia_rr/resources/patents/pte.jsp [https://perma.cc/5NMT-UHFJ].
125. See supra section I.D. Drug companies do not always seize the opportunity to restore more
than one patent. For instance, twice Fujisawa asked for restoration of only one patent, even though
the FDA had approved two applications for the same active ingredient on the same day. The drugs in
question were Prograf (tacrolimus) and Mycamine (micafungin sodium). The PTO had even told the
company that two patents are eligible for extension based on the regulatory review periods for
Mycamine (micafungun sodium) in NDA 21 506 and 21 754. Notice of Final Determination and
Requirement for Election, In re Patent Term Extension Application for U.S. Patent No. 5,376,634,
FDA Docket No. 2005E-0252 (Pat. & Trademark Off. Dec. 10, 2007). But Fujisawa declined to take
this path. See Response to Requirement for Election Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.785, In re Patent Term
Extension Application for U.S. Patent No. 5,376,634 (Pat. & Trademark Off. Jan. 9, 2008)
( Applicants respectfully elect the Application for Patent Term Extension for U.S. Patent
No. 6,107,458 based on NDA 21-506. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully withdraw the Application
for Patent Term Extension of U.S. Patent No. 6,265,536 based on NDA 21-754. ).
126. In nine instances, the patentee received all patent term restoration it had sought, through
sequential interim extensions. We dropped four because the FDA never calculated the regulatory
review period (so we could not confirm the dates asserted by the applicant in its PTR application).
We treated the remaining five as grants of PTR.
127. This includes instances in which the PTO initially granted an extension, but the URAA
extension applied later and took the unrestored patent life past the fourteen-year limit, so no
restoration was ultimately applied. This was true in the case of Zofran (ondansetron) and Suprane
(desflurane), for instance.
128. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (i).
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Gathering Additional Data for Analysis

The final dataset contains 642 drugs (also called observations in the
statistical portion of this Article), for which we gathered other information
as follows. First, we collected regulatory information about each drug:
(1) the date on which the IND took effect, allowing the company to start
clinical trials, (2) the date on which the company submitted its marketing
application, (3) the date on which the FDA approved the application,
(4) the length of the clinical testing period, and (5) the length of the FDA
review period.129 We also assigned each drug a therapeutic category.130
Second, we collected information about each restored patent: (1) the
date on which the inventor filed the patent application that led to issuance
of the patent, (2) the date that would control calculation of a twenty-year
patent term under current law,131 and (3) the date on which the patent
issued, or the date on which the original patent issued in the case of a
reissued patent.132 The collected patent information also included (1) the
type of term the patent enjoyed (seventeen-year, twenty-year, or
transitional and if so which),133 (2) whether the patent was a child
patent, (3) the number of days of patent term adjustment, if any,134 (4) the
129. The FDA publishes this information in the Federal Register when it calculates the regulatory
review period.
130. The methodology was crude. Some drugs in the dataset were withdrawn from the market years
ago, and some were never launched in the U.S. As a result, no readily available dataset provides a
therapeutic category for every drug in the dataset. An orthogonal approach was adopted. For each
drug, five factors were considered: the established pharmacological class assigned by the FDA; the
initial use for which the drug was approved; the category and class assigned in the U.S.
Pharmacopoeia (USP) Medicare Model Guidelines for CMS Version 7.0; the anatomical therapeutic
classification (ATC) assigned by the World Health Organization (WHO); and the category assigned
by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in its National Library of Medicine Drug Portal. Based on
this information, each drug was placed in a category corresponding roughly to one of the categories
in the USP guidelines.
131. If the patent resulted from an original patent application with no reference to an earlier-filed
U.S. application, the relevant date was the filing date of the application or, if applicable, the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) filing date. If the patent resulted from an application that was a
continuation, continuation-in-part, or division of an earlier-filed application, the new application
necessarily cited the earlier application (and any earlier applications, in turn). In these cases, the
relevant date was the earliest filing date of any related U.S. application referenced in the application.
If the restored patent was a reissue of an earlier patent, our analysis identified the relevant date for the
originally issued patent.
132. A patent may be reissued to correct certain types of error; in this case the patent number
changes (and now begins with RE ) but the term remains the same. 35 U.S.C. § 251; see also Patent
Number, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patents-applicationprocess/applying-online/patent-number# [https://perma.cc/AW34-MWK9].
133. See supra Part II.
134. See sources cited supra note 118. Patent term adjustment was generally taken from documents
available on PAIR.
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original patent expiry date (after patent term adjustment) without patent
term restoration,135 (5) how the PTO calculated patent term restoration,136
(6) whether the PTO applied the five-year (or two-year) cap and fourteenyear limit,137 (7) the number of days restored,138 and (8) the final patent
expiry date after restoration.139 These entries reflect case-by-case
judgment calls, based on the law and based on review and consideration
of several sources for each patent. The goal in each case was to ensure
that the patent term type, original expiration date, restoration award, and
revised expiration date were internally consistent (each with the others),
legally correct (considering changes in the law that applied during the
patent life), and corroborated by at least one source.
135. Various sources report this information: the spreadsheet provided by the PTO; the table of
terms restored on the PTO s website; patent term restoration applications themselves; the PTO s
notices of final determination; and for composition of matter and method of use patents covering new
drugs, editions of the ORANGE BOOK published before patent expiry. In this annual publication, the
FDA publishes the numbers and expiration date of every unexpired patent that claims an approved
drug or method of using that drug. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS
WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, at ADA1 263 (39th ed. 2019) (commonly known
as the Orange Book ).
These sources sometimes contained errors, and in some cases the information reported was
superseded by later events. For example, the spreadsheet from the PTO contained typographical
mistakes. In addition, some dates were later changed by patent term adjustment, see supra note 118,
or the URAA extension, see supra Part II. That is, the PTO might have issued a final decision on
patent term restoration before June 1995, relying on a seventeen-year term for the patent, and the term
could have later shifted to a twenty-year term. In this case the PTO s notice of final determination
would have calculated the restoration due and offered a revised expiration date based on adding those
days to the original expiration date. When the patent later converted to a twenty-year term, some of
this information became incorrect, but the PTO did not issue new documents. The dataset reflects the
ultimate final expiry date after all adjustments were made.
It does not, however, capture terminal disclaimers filed later in the life of the patent. A terminal
disclaimer causes the patent to expire on the same date as an earlier patent and is typically filed to
avoid invalidation of the patent on obviousness grounds.
136. This appears in the notice of final determination, and most notices are available on PAIR or
(in a few cases) on Westlaw. Some contain mathematical or calendar errors, but in these cases the
patent extension certificate is typically still correct.
137. This appears in the notice of final determination. We corroborated it with the patent term
extension certificate or the list of patent terms extended on the PTO s website, or the ORANGE BOOK
if neither of these sources provided the information needed. We confirmed application of the fourteenyear limit by comparing all final expiration dates with all FDA approval dates, and we confirmed
application of the two-year and five-year caps by comparing final expiration dates with original
expiration dates.
138. We took this from the notice of final determination, if it was available on PAIR, the extension
certificate, or the list of patent terms extended on the PTO s website.
139. We took this from the notice of final determination and corroborated it with at least one other
source typically the list on the PTO s website, but in some cases the ORANGE BOOK. As explained
in supra note 135, the dates reported in these documents were sometimes superseded by later events.
In these cases the dataset reflects the corrected information, which was corroborated with at least one
additional source whenever possible.
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Third, we gathered information about the lifecycle of the 554 nonbiological drugs but not the eighty-eight biologics in the dataset.140
This included the number and filing date of every patent claiming the drug
or an approved method of using the drug listed in the ORANGE BOOK
before April 1, 2018.141 This information is incomplete for antibiotics
approved before 1997 because this publication omits patents on these
drugs that expired before October 8, 2008.142 The dataset also includes the
date on which the company launched the non-biological drug in the
market and the launch date of the first generic drug containing the same
active ingredient.143
B.

The Effect of Patent Term Restoration
The resulting dataset of drugs and biologics approved over more than

140. The Hatch-Waxman Amendments included statutory authority to approve generic drugs, and
FDA approved generic drugs throughout the period covered by our dataset. Congress did not enact
comparable authority for biologics until 2010. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
141. The patent numbers and expiration dates appear in the ORANGE BOOK. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., supra note 135, at ADA 1 ADA 263. The filing date for purposes of the dataset was the
earliest filing date appearing on the face of the patent, considering patent filings in other countries
and any provisional application filed in the United States.
142. Before November 1, 1997, antibiotic drugs reached the market under section 507 of the FDCA
rather than section 505 of the FDCA. 21 U.S.C. § 357 (1994), repealed by Pub. L. No. 105-115,
§ 125(b)(1), 111 Stat. 2325 (1997)). The Hatch-Waxman scheme did not apply to them, so they were
not subject to patent listing requirements. The pre-1997 ( old ) antibiotics were not subject to listing
requirements until October 7, 2008. Q1 Program Supplemental Funding Act of 2008, Pub L. No. 110379, § 4(b), 122 Stat. 4075 (2008) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355); Draft Guidance for Industry
on the Submission of Patent Information for Certain Old Antibiotics, 73 Fed. Reg. 73,659 (Dec. 3,
2008). Beginning on October 8, 2008, the holders of approved applications for old antibiotics listed
patents, including patents that had already been issued, but they did not list expired patents. Thus, if
a patent for an old antibiotic expired before that date, it would have never appeared in the ORANGE
BOOK.
143. IQVIA provided the launch dates. We do not have complete launch date information, however,
for four reasons. First, IQVIA reports only the month and year the drug is launched in the United
States, so (for instance) it fails to distinguish between January 1 and January 31, which could be
material for some analysis we perform. Second, we requested (and IQVIA provided) launch
information only for drugs for which a patent had been restored by the spring 2017. Third, for some
of these drugs, IQVIA lacked the data in question. Fourth, in several cases the launch date was not
useable in our analysis. Launch dates before approval were treated as error. Launch dates more than
six months after product approval were flagged for follow-up. In a handful of cases, follow-up in
other sources typically trade press or securities filings revealed a reason not to rely on the IQVIA
date for purposes of the planned analysis. To give an example, Cesamet (nabilone) was launched, but
then acquired by a second company and relaunched, and IQVIA reported only the relaunch date. In
this case, the IQVIA date was excluded. For quality assurance, the generic drug launch dates were
also compared with information from FDA s website about the timing of first generic approval, and
other sources (such as trade press and securities filings) were used to investigate discrepancies. In a
handful of cases, investigation led to exclusion of the IQVIA information.
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thirty years provides a basis for robust description of average clinical trial
program length, effective patent life before patent term restoration, and
the impact of patent term restoration. The average clinical development
program in the dataset is 6.04 years (median 5.29 years). This is consistent
with the findings of an earlier paper in this series, based on a smaller
dataset that excluded biologics and ended one year earlier, which found
an average of 5.96 years (median 5.23 years).144
In this dataset, average effective patent life without restoration
meaning the time from FDA approval to the original expiration date of the
patent is 8.71 years (median 9.49 years). This is somewhat shorter than
the average effective patent life reported in empirical studies that
supported patent term restoration in the first place.145 Whether effective
patent life (before restoration) has changed over time is more complex.
The average effective patent life of patents in the dataset has increased
over the passage of time, in the sense that patents in the dataset issued in
the later years of the interval studied have more life remaining after FDA
approval than patents issued in the earlier years of the interval studied. As
Figure 1 in the Appendix shows, patents in the dataset issued in the 1980s
tended to have eight to ten years of life remaining after FDA approval,
and patents issued in the 2000s tended to have (or, if not expired, tend to
have) ten to twelve years of life remaining. But the average effective
patent life for the drugs in the dataset has not increased over time: drugs
approved in recent years tend to have around the same average effective
patent life as drugs approved at the beginning of the interval studied. As
Figure 2 shows, drugs approved in the 1980s tended to average eight to
ten years of effective patent life, as did drugs approved in the 1990s and
drugs approved in the 2000s.
The average amount of patent life restored in this dataset was 1,049
days or 2.87 years (median 944 days, or 2.59 years). Others have reported
similar numbers.146 This does not represent the average that one would
144. Lietzan, supra note 38, at 88. The finding is also consistent with the findings of other scholars.
See, e.g., Steven M. Paul et al., How to Improve R&D Productivity: The Pharmaceutical Industry s
Grand Challenge, 9 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 203, 206 (2010) (noting that the three clinical
development phases take 1.5, 2.5 and 2.5 years, respectively, and the phase from submission to launch
requires another eighteen months); KI Kaitin & JA DiMasi, Pharmaceutical Innovation in the 21st
Century: New Drug Approvals in the First Decade, 2000–2009, 89 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 183,187 (2010) (noting that the average clinical development time for drugs approved
between 2005 and 2009 was 6.4 years).
145. See SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 83, at 173 (reporting that average effective patent life for new
drugs had dropped to 12.4 years by the early 1970s); Eisman & Wardell, supra note 83, at 20 (finding
that the average had dropped to 9.5 years by 1979).
146. For instance, Professors Beall, Darrow, and Kesselheim reported a median restoration of 2.75
years in the eighty-three drugs of their dataset that received patent term restoration. Beall et al., supra
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expect under current law, because 113 drugs in the dataset were subject to
the two-year cap.147 With these drugs omitted, the average restoration for
the remaining 529 drugs is 1,117 days or 3.06 years.148 The average
effective patent life in the dataset after patent term restoration is 11.58
years (median 12.83 years).149 This average is consistent with earlier
reports examining drugs approved in the 1990s but lower than a figure
reported for recently approved top-selling drugs.150 Figure 3 in the
Appendix shows that average effective patent life after restoration has not
meaningfully changed since the late 1980s and that it varies less than
effective patent life before restoration.
C.

The Determinants of Effective Patent Life

We hypothesized that longer premarket research and development
programs would lead to shorter effective patent life. We also hypothesized
that because the statute does not restore every day of patent life lost to
premarket testing, this effect would still be evident today. To assess these
questions, we performed a series of regressions to identify the
determinants of effective patent life both before and after the PTO applies
note 25, at 20. In 1996, Professors Grabowski and Vernon found that the average patent term
extension for new drugs coming to the market in the 1991 to 1993 period was 2.3 years. Henry
Grabowski & John Vernon, Longer Patents for Increased Generic Competition in the US: The
Waxman-Hatch Act After One Decade, 10 PHARMACOECONOMICS 110, 119 20, 121 (1996). And in
1998, the Congressional Budget Office reported that the fifty-one new drugs approved between 1992
and 1995 that enjoyed patent term restoration received an average of 2.9 years. CONG. BUDGET OFF.,
HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 40 (July 1998). In 2008, however, Charles Clift reported that twentysix of the top forty best-selling drugs in 2006 benefitted from patent term restoration and received an
average of 3.6 years. Charles Clift, The Value of Patent Term Extensions to the Pharmaceutical
Industry in the USA, 5 J. GENERIC MED. 201, 205 06 (2008).
147. This includes two pipeline drugs with patents that expired before FDA approval, which
therefore received two years of effective patent life from the date of FDA approval. See supra
section I.D. These were Corlopam (fenoldopam mesylate) and Remeron (mirtazapine).
148. In a counterfactual world in which only the five-year cap applied, the average restoration for
the entire dataset of 642 drugs would have been 1,186 days or 3.25 years.
149. As discussed in section IV.C., however, if the two-year cap had not applied to 18% of the
dataset, meaning in a counterfactual world in which only the five-year cap applied, the average would
have been higher.
150. See Beall et al., supra note 25, at 21 (examining the 170 best-selling new drugs that
experienced generic market entry between 2000 and 2012 and reporting a median effective patent life
of 13.25 years for the eighty-three that received patent term restoration). But see Grabowski &
Vernon, supra note 146, at 120 (reporting that new chemical entities approved from 1991 to 1993 had
an average effective patent life, after restoration, of 11.8 years, which the authors claimed in 1996
was probabl representative of the average patent lives of new chemical entities then coming onto
the market); CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 146, at 40 (reporting 11.5 years for the fifty-one new
drugs approved between 1992 and 1995 that enjoyed patent term restoration).
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patent term restoration.151
1.

Effective Patent Life Before Patent Term Restoration

Using our full dataset of 642 observations, we performed regression
analysis to assess which variables explain effective patent life before the
award of patent term restoration (Regression 1).152 This regression had
high explanatory power; in statistical terms, the adjusted R2 was 0.84. In
simple English, this means that 84% of the variation in the dependent
variable (effective patent life) was explained by the independent variables
found to have explanatory power. The results for Regression 1 appear in
Table 1 in the Appendix and are summarized here.
Certain variables had negative coefficients, meaning that as they
increase the effective patent life decreases. To begin with, the length of
time between the patent (or if applicable, parent patent) filing date and the
start of clinical trials was negatively correlated with effective patent life.
We treat this period as a rough proxy for the preclinical testing period.153
The length of the clinical testing period was also negatively correlated
with effective patent life. In statistical terms, the coefficients were small
but strongly statistically significant which means that the impact was
small but unlikely to be a matter of chance.154 We expected these results.
We also investigated the possibility that certain therapeutic categories
were negatively correlated with effective patent life before restoration and
found that only one category (antipsychotics) had explanatory power. We
did not expect this result. We discuss these findings in Part IV.
We also assessed several independent variables relating to the type of

151. A regression analysis is a statistical process for mathematically establishing the relationships
between variables and estimating their impact. In a regression analysis, the dependent variable is the
main factor that one is trying to understand or predict, and the independent variables are factors
believed to have an impact on the dependent variable. Several approaches can be used. The Appendix
describes the regression models used.
152. This was an ordinary least squares regression. Details can be found in the Appendix.
153. For this calculation, the filing date is the date that controlled (or would have controlled)
calculation of the twenty-year patent term. See sources cited supra note 131. Our goal was to identify
a date on which it could reasonably be concluded the company had begun preclinical testing. But this
period is a rough proxy for the preclinical testing period for at least two reasons. First, the preclinical
testing will usually have usually begun before this filing date. See supra note 72. Second, the patent
in question might not be the earliest filed patent or the active ingredient patent.
154. The coefficient for this variable (length of the proxy-preclinical testing period) was negative
but numerically low (-0.0018). In simple terms, the coefficient value represents how much of the
dependent variable (here the effective patent life, measured in days) changes, with a one unit shift in
the independent variable (here length of proxy-preclinical testing, measured in days), if the other
independent variables are held constant. For the length of the clinical testing period, the coefficient
was again low, -0.0016. The p-values for both independent variables in simple terms the
probability that the results occurred by chance were below 0.000.
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patent and patent term, with varying results. On the one hand, the
following were positively correlated with effective patent life before
restoration: (1) a child patent, (2) a patent with a seventeen-year term
because of the URAA transition provisions, (3) a patent with a twentyyear term because of the URAA transition provisions, and (4) a patent
with a post-URAA twenty-year term. In fact, they were very strongly
correlated. On the other hand, (1) a child patent with a transitional twentyyear term, and (2) a child patent with a post-URAA twenty-year term were
strongly negatively correlated with effective patent life before the
restoration award. These findings are unsurprising and are discussed
in Part IV.
The number of days restored by the PTO was negatively correlated with
effective patent life before restoration. This makes sense, because the
restoration award is based on the number of days lost. The coefficient was,
however, quite small (-0.0017), meaning the impact was small. Imposition
of the two-year cap on the restoration award was strongly negatively
correlated with effective patent life (before restoration). The reasons for
this are unclear but may relate to the fact that the two-year cap applied
only to patents issued before September 24, 1984, covering drugs already
in clinical trials. More than three quarters (86 of 113, or 76%) of these
patents had been filed in the 1960s or 1970s, which suggests that the drugs
in question had unusually long overall research and
development programs.
2.

Effective Patent Life After Patent Term Restoration

We performed five statistical regressions to assess which variables
explain effective patent life after patent term restoration, that is, final
effective patent life. Regression 2 included the full dataset, 642
observations, while Regressions 3 through 6 examined subsets of the data
defined by patent term. We isolated these subsets to establish whether the
determinants of effective patent life differ by patent term regime (preURAA, post-URAA, or transitional).
Regression 2 examined the determinants of final effective patent life in
the entire dataset of 642 observations.155 Regression 3 examined the
determinants of final effective patent life in the subset of 314 observations
with a seventeen-year patent term.156 This comprises sixty-five
observations subject to the pre-URAA patent term regime and 249
observations that received seventeen-year terms by operation of the
155. This was a right-censored tobit regression. Details can be found in the Appendix.
156. This was a right-censored tobit regression. Details can be found in the Appendix.
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URAA transition provisions. Regression 4 examined the determinants of
effective patent life after patent term restoration in the subset of 328
observations with a twenty-year patent term.157 This comprises 150
observations subject to the post-URAA patent term regime and 178
observations subject to twenty-year terms by operation of the URAA
transition provisions. Regression 5 examined the determinants of final
effective patent life in the subset of 150 observations with a post-URAA
twenty-year patent term.158 Regression 6 examined the determinants of
final effective patent life in the subset of ninety-five observations to which
the five-year cap applied.159
Several key finds emerged from the results of these regressions, which
are detailed in Table 1 of the Appendix. First, in Regression 2, which
considered the entire dataset of 642 observations, the determinants of final
effective patent life were virtually the same as the determinants of
effective patent life before restoration with the exception that one would
expect: the number of days restored.160 Thus a longer clinical period was
associated with a shorter final effective patent life, as was a longer proxypreclinical period, although here too the association was weak. Selecting
a child patent subject to the post-URAA twenty-year term had the most
powerful negative influence on final patent life (but overall, selecting a
patent subject to the twenty-year term had a strongly positive impact).
Selecting a patent subject to the transition provisions (i.e., a patent for
which the more favorable of the two term calculations applied) had the
most powerful positive influence on final effective patent life. The
independent variables in this regression explained 36% of the variation in
final effective patent life.
Second, in every regression, the length of the proxy-preclinical period
and the length of the clinical period had negative explanatory power. That
is, as these periods got longer, the final effective patent life (after patent
term restoration) consistently got shorter. We expected this. And in each
regression, again, the coefficients were small but strongly statistically
significant meaning that the impact was small but unlikely to be a matter
of chance.161 In every regression, other independent variables played a

157. This was a right-censored tobit regression. Details can be found in the Appendix.
158. This was a right-censored tobit regression. Details can be found in the Appendix.
159. This was an ordinary least squares regression. Details can be found in the Appendix.
160. Because the number of days restored is proportional to the number of days lost, it should be
negatively correlated with effective patent life before patent term restoration and positively correlated
with effective patent life after restoration.
161. The coefficient for this variable (length of the proxy-preclinical testing period) was negative
but numerically low (-0.0018). For the length of the clinical testing period, the coefficient was again
low, -0.0016. The p-values for both independent variables were below 0.000.
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more powerful role in driving the final effective patent life typically
variables relating to the patent selected for restoration.
Third, therapeutic categories were generally not correlated with final
effective patent life (that is, after restoration). There were a handful of
exceptions. In Regressions 2 and 6, the antipsychotic drug therapeutic
category, alone, had explanatory power. This category is negatively
correlated with final effective patent life. In Regression 3, which
examined the subset of patents with a seventeen-year patent term (through
pre-URAA terms or transition provisions), ten therapeutic categories (of
the thirty-eight total) were negatively correlated with final effective patent
life. In Regression 4, the subset of patents with a twenty-year patent term
(through the URAA or the transition provisions), analgesic drugs were
strongly negatively corrected with final effective patent life, while three
other categories (gastrointestinal drugs, immunological agents, and
hormonal agents) were positively correlated with final effective patent
life. Finally, in Regression 5, the subset of patents subject only to the postURAA regime, analgesic drugs were strongly negatively correlated with
final effective patent life, while antiemetics and hormonal agents were
positively correlated. However, on the whole therapeutic categories
associated with long clinical programs were not associated with shorter
final effective patent life. We did not expect this result and discuss it in
section IV.B.162
Fourth, the results for child patents were complex but generally
confirmed our instincts. We expected that selecting a child patent for
restoration would be associated with longer final effective patent life
when a seventeen-year patent term applied, but not when the twenty-year
term applied. As noted, selecting a child patent subject to the post-URAA
twenty-year term had a powerful, highly significant, negative influence
on final effective patent life, both before restoration and with restoration.
In the subset of 328 observations with patents that have a twenty-year term
(through the URAA or the transition provisions) Regression 4 having
a child patent was not uncorrelated correlated with final effective patent
life. In the subset of 314 observations with seventeen-year patent terms
(through the pre-URAA law or the transition provisions)
Regression 3 none of the child patent variables had explanatory power.
In the case of Regression 5, which considered the subset of 150
observations with the post-URAA twenty-year patent term (i.e., no
transitional terms): having a child patent was somewhat negatively
162. Of the 418 instances (thirty-eight therapeutic categories in eleven regressions) in which
therapeutic categories could be significant, only twenty-six of these variables have any explanatory
power, a mere 6.2%. Moreover, of these twenty-six, fifteen are significant at the 10% level, nine are
significant at the 5% level, and only two are significant at the 1% level.
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correlated with final effective patent life. Finally, in the subset of ninetyfive observations subject to the five-year cap Regression 6 having a
child patent was negatively correlated with final effective patent life, but
having a child patent with a seventeen-year transitional term or a twentyyear term (whether through the URAA or the transition provisions) was
strongly positively correlated with final effective patent life. We discuss
these results in section IV.A.
3.

Fourteen-Year Effective Patent Life

We performed two additional regressions with the entire dataset of 642
observations to answer the same question in a different way, focusing on
variables that dictate whether a drug enjoys the full fourteen years of
effective patent life possible under section 156. In our dataset, 215 drugs
(33.5%) reached the fourteen-year limit.163 Regression 7 sought to
identify variables that determine the percentage of fourteen years
achieved by a particular drug.164 Regression 8 sought to identify the
variables that determine whether a drug comes close to reaching the
fourteen-year limit specifically, within 10% of fourteen years thus,
whether the final effective patent life was 12.6 or more years.165 Within
our dataset, 334 drugs (52.0%) reached 12.6 years or more of final
effective patent life.
In both regressions, the length of the proxy-preclinical testing period
and the length of the clinical period had negative explanatory power. That
is, as these periods got longer, the percentage of fourteen years got shorter,
and the chances of reaching at least 12.6 years got lower. But the actual
impact was trivial. The independent variables selected for Regression 7
explained 77% of the variability in the percentage of fourteen years
achieved, and the most powerful determinants were in order of
decreasing influence: (1) selection of a patent that would enjoy seventeen
years through the transition provisions (positive), (2) selection of a patent
163. This is lower than the percentage reported by Beall for recently approved best-selling drugs.
See Beall et al., supra note 25, at 21 (reporting that thirty-one drugs out of eighty-three, or 37%, in
the sample had restored patent life reaching the fourteen-year limit). When the 113 drugs subject to
the two-year cap are excluded from our dataset, 210 of the remaining 529 drugs (40%) hit the
fourteen-year cap. This is much lower than the percentage reported by Beall. See id. (reporting that
when drugs subject to the two-year cap were excluded from the analysis, the percentage rose to
seventy (thirty-one of forty-four drugs)); see also CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 146, at 40
( [A]bout half of the 43 drugs introduced between 1992 and 1995 that received Hatch-Waxman
extensions and were not limited by the transitional cap had their extensions limited by the 14-year
cap. ).
164. This was an ordinary least squares regression. Details can be found in the Appendix.
165. This was a probit regression. Details can be found in the Appendix.
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under the new post-URAA patent regime (positive), (3) selection of a
patent that would enjoy twenty years through the transition provisions
(positive), (4) selection of a child patent subject to the twenty-year term
(negative), (5) selection of a child patent (positive), (6) selection of a child
patent subject to the twenty-year term through the transition provisions
(negative), (7) application of the two-year cap (negative), and
(8) selection of a child patent subject to a seventeen-year term through the
transition provisions (negative). Regression 8 had low explanatory power,
suggesting that omitted variables may have a fair amount to do with
whether a drug hits at least 12.6 years.166 These findings are discussed in
Part IV, and the full results appear in Table 2 in the Appendix.
IV. DISCUSSION OF POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The findings in this study provide compelling support for some of the
initial hypotheses, though not others. To begin with, as expected our legal
system not only distorts patents but also provides less effective patent life
for drugs that take longer to develop. The impact of the five-year cap on
effective patent life turns out to be harder to unpack, though, possibly
because more drugs in the dataset were subject to a no longer relevant
two-year cap. And it turns out that therapeutic categories generally do not
explain final effective patent life. The findings also raise an interesting
question about the impact of the 1994 change in the patent term. When
Congress enacted patent term restoration, however, lawmakers chose to
allow restoration of child patents, because this would allow drug
developers to reach fourteen years of effective patent life. Lawmakers
changed how child patent terms are calculated, in 1994, without
considering the impact on patent term restoration or incentives to develop
new drugs. And as we expected, this change gutted the choice made
in 1984.
A.

Distortion and Paradox

The primary incentive to discover and develop a new drug is the
prospect of a period for exclusive marketing made possible in part by the
protection of patents associated with the drug.167 But by the time the
federal government permits the inventor to commercialize the invention,

166. The adjusted R2 was 0.65, meaning that only 65% of the variation in the dependent variable
(here, whether the final term was 12.6 years or higher) is explained by the independent variables
found to have explanatory power.
167. See supra section I.B.
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much of the patent term has already lapsed. In the years before enactment
of section 156, effective patent life for drugs had dropped to 9.5 years.168
Many who supported patent term restoration not only drug patent
owners but the FDA, the PTO, and academic economists grounded their
arguments in this distortion, citing the length of premarket testing
programs, the shortening of effective patent life, and concerns about the
incentive to innovate.169
Our legal system does not merely distort patents, however; it
paradoxically provides less incentive (truncates the patent more) when a
drug takes more time to develop. We call this the innovation paradox, and
we hypothesized that it would be readily apparent when examining the
drugs in our dataset before the PTO extended their patent terms. And it
was. Moreover, because the 1984 law does not restore every day of patent
life lost to premarket research and development, we hypothesized that the
paradox would still be evident today. And it is. The paradox was apparent
in every regression considering the determinants of final effective patent
life. In every regression, a longer clinical period was associated with a
shorter final effective patent life, and a longer period between patent filing
and clinical trials was associated with a shorter final effective patent life.
Although the magnitude of the impact was very small, the results were
strongly statistically significant, confirming our hypothesis that longer
premarket research and development programs lead to shorter effective
patent life, even with patent term restoration in place.170
Our findings also show that the type of patent restored child or parent,
subject to the seventeen-year term or the twenty-year term has played a
powerful role in determining final effective patent life. This merits
reflection, because Congress chose in 1984 to allow companies to select
the patent for restoration, and because it later amended the patent term
without considering the effect of the change on patent term restoration.
When Congress enacted patent term restoration in 1984, it assumed a
simple world. The patent term lasted for seventeen years from issuance.
In August 1984, Senator Hatch and Representative Waxman brokered a
series of final changes to the pending legislation, to secure the drug
168. Eisman & Wardell, supra note 83, at 20.
169. See generally Lietzan, supra note 79, at 111 25 (discussing the legislative efforts relating to
patent term restoration from the early 1980s through the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman
amendments).
170. In several regressions, specific years of marketing approval also had explanatory power. For
instance, in Regression 2 (determinants of final effective patent life in the entire dataset), every year
of FDA approval between 1985 and 2014, inclusive, was correlated with shorter effective patent life,
with the coefficient varying from -1.76 (1985) to -4.14 (2010). This indicates that relative to the base
year of 1984, patents on drugs approved in subsequent years had shorter final effective patent lives.
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industr s support (and tacit agreement not to challenge an aspect of the
legislation that raised constitutional issues).171 Chief among these changes
was the elimination of language that limited patent term restoration to the
first-issued patent on the drug.172 This language had reflected objections
to the restoration of continuation patents,173 and its elimination would
make it possible for a company to reach fourteen years of effective patent
life with a child patent.174 And that was the point.175 It would be possible
to reach fourteen years with a child patent because of the seventeen-year
patent term. In this simple world, if a patent issued after clinical trials
began, less of the clinical period would be eligible for restoration.176 If
this patent was a child patent, though, it had a later original expiry date
than earlier-issued patents, which meant that the smaller number of days
would be added to a later original expiry date. And because the PTO
restored only 50% of the time spent in trials, restoring this later-issuing
child patent would always mean a longer final effective patent life than
restoring an earlier-issuing patent of either type.
Congress changed how patent terms would be calculated in 1995,
and simply as a mathematical matter gutted the August 1984 decision.
Once the URAA takes full effect that is, once drug companies have only
post-URAA patents from which to select every patent that could be
proposed for restoration will enjoy a twenty-year term starting on its
application date or its parent s application date. As alread explained, a
later-filed patent will generally issue later, so less of the clinical period
will be eligible for restoration. But in this new world, if the later-filed
patent is a child patent, it will not have a later original expiration date (to
add this smaller restoration to). In other words, the company can no longer
use a continuation patent to ensure it receives fourteen years of final
effective patent life as envisioned in the final round of negotiations
in 1984.
Our results, though complex, generally confirm this gutting. To begin
with, selecting a child patent is positively associated with nearing the
fourteen-year limit on effective patent life even though selecting a child
patent with a transitional term (of either sort) or a child patent with a
twenty-year term is negatively associated with nearing the limit
171. Lietzan, supra note 79, at 105 06.
172. Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived
Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 389, 404 05 (1999).
173. See Lietzan, supra note 79, at 88.
174. Id. at 106.
175. Id.
176. See supra Part II.
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(Regression 7). These findings provide powerful confirmation of the
value of selecting a child patent in the remaining (alternative) scenario:
when the pre-URAA seventeen-year term applied.177 This is precisely
what Congress intended in 1984. In contrast, selecting a child patent for
restoration is associated with a shorter final effective patent life in the case
of a child patent with a twenty-year term, either through a transitional term
or post-URAA (Regressions 1 and 2). This is precisely the opposite of
what Congress intended in 1984.178
The nature of the patent term restoration formula makes it impossible
to draw robust conclusions about the impact of the URAA using this
dataset.179 Although the URAA took effect in June 1995, and indeed
applied in a sense retroactively (by applying transition provisions to
patents then in force), in another sense even now it is not fully in place for
the patent term restoration purposes. Only one-quarter of the restored
patents in our dataset (150 patents, or 23%) were post-URAA patents.
And in this subset, none of the patent-related independent variables has
explanatory power. Only sixty-five patents in the dataset (10%) were
subject to the pre-URAA scheme.180 A comparison of the average final
177. In Regression 7, which uses the full set of 642 observations to examine the percent of the
fourteen years achieved, selecting a child patent with a transitional seventeen-year term was
negatively associated with nearing the fourteen-year limit. Such a patent would be assigned the
seventeen-year term simply because applying the twenty-year term was less advantageous. This
would be true the old calculation would have been more favorable if the parent application had
been filed more than three years before the PTO issued the child patent. It is possible the lapse of time
between parent and child applications reflects a longer overall premarket research and development
process, which could help to explain the negative association with getting close to fourteen years. But
we did not test this in our regressions.
178. Regression 5 complicates the picture. This considered the determinants of final effective
patent life in the 150 observations subject to the post-URAA patent term, and it found that a child
patent had no explanatory power. This likely reflects the fact that section 156 allows a company to
select any patent for restoration. In the pre-URAA period, a company could choose a child patent in
order to achieve fourteen years. Although this strategy is unlikely to work in the post-URAA world,
the company would presumably avoid selecting a child patent that would work to its disadvantage.
179. The text addresses whether the URAA eliminated the intended benefit of selecting a child
patent for restoration. The URAA could have had another negative impact on effective patent life,
but enactment of patent term adjustment applicable to patent applications filed after May 29, 2000
should have offset that impact as follows. The URAA would ordinarily lead to shorter effective patent
life than prior law if a patent application was pending at the PTO for more than three years, because
in this case twenty years from the application would end earlier than seventeen years from issuance.
When patent term adjustment applies, however, delay beyond the three years is generally added back
day for day. See sources cited supra note 118. Suppose the patent issues during the clinical trials. The
company may seek patent term restoration for all days in trials after patent issuance, though it will be
limited to 50% recovery. If the patent was delayed at the PTO, it may also recover those days, but it
will receive them in full.
180. The vast majority of the patents in our dataset 427 patents, or 68% were subject to the
URAA transition rules.
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effective patent life in the two groups 12.48 years for post-URAA
patents and 7.36 years for pre-URAA patents would not tell us the
impact of the URAA, because 74% of the pre-URAA patents were also
subject to the two-year cap, which no longer applies. In an attempt to
better understand the impact of the URAA, however, we recalculated
patent term restoration in the counterfactual world in which Congress did
not change the patent term and did not enact patent term adjustment.181 In
this counterfactual world, the average effective patent life in our dataset
after restoration would have been 11.61 years, which is not meaningfully
different from the average in the real world (11.58 years).182
Within a few years, every company with a recently approved drug or
biologic will hold only patents subject to the twenty-year term.183 At this
point, it will no longer be possible to obtain fourteen years of effective
patent life on a continuation patent through application of patent term
restoration. A very short research and development program will always
have the potential to yield fourteen years of effective patent life.
Otherwise the path to a fourteen-year effective patent life will be different:
use of a later-issued original patent.184 But whether this patent will
effectively preclude approval and launch of a generic or biosimilar copy
is another question.185 These are issues that Congress did not consider in
1995. A review of the legislative history suggests no attention was paid to
the relationship between the new patent term and the formula for patent
term restoration.186
181. This counterfactual has limitations. For instance, we changed no other variables and thus
assumed that the PTO took the same amount of time to issue the patent. We also assumed the company
would have selected the same patent for restoration.
182. The median would have been higher (13.05 years, instead of 12.83 years).
183. Only one of the six drugs in our dataset approved by FDA in 2015 the latest year for which
we have data had a transition patent restored. Only two of the thirteen approved in 2014 had a
transition patent restored. And although our study does not cover new drugs approved in subsequent
years, only two new chemical entities approved in 2018 are covered by composition of matter or
method of use patents with transitional terms.
184. This could explain why the results in the counterfactual world are not meaningfully different
from the results in the real world. So long as the PTO issued those original patents within three years
of the patent application, the initial and restored patent expiry dates would not have been significantly
different had the pre-URAA regime applied.
185. These will not be active ingredient patents, which are the most likely to block approval of an
abbreviated application. See supra section I.B.; see also Henry Grabowski et al., Pharmaceutical
Patent Challenges: Company Strategies and Litigation Outcomes, 3 AM. J. HEALTH ECON. 33, 40
(2017) ( Most often, firms will then apply for patent term extension on their key active ingredient
patent, since this provides the broadest scope of patent protection and frequently expires earlier than
any non-AI patents. ).
186. Although policymakers may have discussed the relationship between the URAA and patent
term restoration, we found no evidence of these discussions in the following legislative materials:
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Role of Therapeutic Category

We expected that some therapeutic categories would be associated with
shorter effective patent life. Studies before enactment of section 156 had
noted that effective patent life varied by therapeutic category,187 but the
policymaking discussions related to design of section 156 did not take this
into account.188 Clinical program length has continued to vary by
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994); H.R. REP. NO. 103826, pt. 1 (1994); H.R. REP. NO. 103-826, pt. 2 (1994); H.R. Res. 564, 103d Cong. (1994); H.R. REP.
NO. 103-829 (1994); S. REP. NO. 103-412 (1994); H.R. DOC. NO. 103-195 (1994); H.R. DOC.
NO. 103-316, vol. 1 (1994); H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, vol. 2 (1994); Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means,
103d Cong. (1993); Trade Agreements Resulting from the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means and Its Subcomm. on Trade, 103d
Cong. (1994); GATT: The Experts View: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Pol y, Trade &
Env t of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affs., 103d Cong. (1994); Review of the Uruguay Round GATT
Agreement Implications for Agriculture Trade: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Agric., 103d Cong.
(1994); Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com.,
Consumer Prot., & Competitiveness of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 103d Cong. (1994); GATT
Subsidies Code and Its Impact on R&D: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Env t & Aviation of
the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., 103d Cong. (1994); World Trade Organization: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 103d Cong. (1994); Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 103d Cong. (1994); General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Lab. & Hum. Res., 103d Cong. (1994); Results
of the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 103d Cong.
(1994); GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp.,
103d Cong. (1994); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX N, 103D CONG., DESCRIPTION OF THE
CHAIRMAN S REMARKS RELATING TO THE FINANCING OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY
ROUND AGREEMENT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) (Comm. Print
1994); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX N, 103D CONG., POSSIBLE PROPOSALS TO FINANCE THE
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (Comm.
Print 1994); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX N, 103D CONG., DESCRIPTIONS OF PROPOSALS
RELATING TO FINANCING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT OF THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) AS APPROVED BY THE S. COMM. ON FIN.
(Comm. Print 1994); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX N, 103D CONG., ESTIMATES OF FINANCING
PACKAGE FOR THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE (Comm. Print 1994); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX N, 103D CONG., STAFF
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TENTATIVELY AGREED TO ITEMS IN FINANCING PACKAGE FOR THE
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (Comm.
Print 1994); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX N, 103D CONG., SUMMARY OF THE PROVISIONS FOR FIN.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) (Comm. Print. 1994); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX N, 103D CONG.,
FINANCING FOR THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE (GATT) (Comm. Print 1994).
187. See, e.g., Leonard G. Schifrin, Lessons from the Drug Lag: A Retrospective Analysis of the
1962 Drug Regulations, 5 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL Y 91, 116 (1982) (showing the decline in average
effective patent life from 1966 to 1969 and from 1970 to 1973 by therapeutic area, and showing that
diuretics and cardiovascular drugs and anti-inflammatory agents were the hardest hit (citing
SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 83, at 173)).
188. See generally Lietzan, supra note 79, at 1112 25 (providing history of the Hatch-Waxman
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therapeutic category.189 Because the formula did not account for this, and
because it does not restore every day of patent life lost to premarket
research and development, we expected that therapeutic categories would
be associated with shorter effective patent life both before and
after restoration.
The therapeutic categories in our dataset vary in effective patent life
without restoration: from an average of 4.51 years (eight antipsychotics)
to an average of 11.91 years (six antimigraine agents). In addition to
antipsychotics, sleep disorder agents, anticonvulsants, vaccines,
analgesics, and antidepressants average seven or fewer years of effective
patent life remaining at the time of FDA approval. In addition to
antimigraine agents, antivirals, diagnostic agents, dermatological agents,
and anesthetics average ten or more years of patent life remaining. Most
categories had large ranges. For instance, antibacterials ranged from -0.76
years to 13.86 years; antidepressants ranged from -1.5 years to 13.96
years, and cardiovascular drugs ranged from -2.7 years to 13.8 years. Final
effective patent life after restoration varies less by therapeutic category
(as it does less in general), ranging again from antipsychotics (8.29 years)
and sleep disorder agents (9.61 years) at the low end to antiviral drugs
(13.18 years) and antimigraine agents (13.74 years) at the high end. Final
effective patent life still varies within each category; antibacterials, for
instance, range from 3.69 years to the full fourteen years. These results
appear in Table 3 in the Appendix.
Although effective patent life before and after restoration varies by
therapeutic category, our regressions showed that therapeutic category
generally does not explain effective patent life. As noted, there were a few
exceptions, but the explanatory power is not strong, and the statistical
significance is not overwhelming.190 This may stem from the small
number of observations in each therapeutic category, limiting the
categor s explanator power. But the value of the therapeutic category
for empirical scholarship relating to innovation policy continues to be
unclear. Therapeutic categories generally group drugs by body system or
symptom targeted, rather than by disease or condition targeted, type of
condition (acute or chronic), chemical class, mechanism of action, or
physiological effect.191 As a result, many categories contain drugs that
have in common only the body system targeted. Some categories are
Amendments, including section 156, based on exhaustive review of the legislative history).
189. Lietzan, supra note 38, at 101 02.
190. See supra section III.C.
191. Littman, supra note 46, at 22; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PAVING THE WAY FOR
PERSONALIZED MEDICINE: FDA S ROLE IN A NEW ERA OF MEDICAL PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 17
(2013).
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wildly variable in both clinical trial length and effective patent life,
suggesting that therapeutic category might not be the correct way to
understand the effect of patent term distortion. It is convention in
innovation policy to work by therapeutic category, but when focusing on
the effect of research and development challenges and regulatory
requirements, it may be more appropriate to focus on pharmacologic class
instead.192 We did not capture this in our dataset.
C.

Impact of the Five-Year and Two-Year Caps

Earlier work led us to suspect that the five-year cap exacerbates the
distortion of patents by the regulatory framework. The cap means that
once a clinical program reaches a certain length, any more testing will
simply translate to lost patent life. We hypothesized that hitting the fiveear cap would make a drug s final effective patent life shorter and less
likely to reach the fourteen-year limit.
The results were more nuanced. Application of the five-year cap had
no explanatory power with respect to final effective patent life in the entire
dataset (Regression 2) or the subset of observations with a seventeen-year
patent term (Regression 3), nor did it explain the percentage of fourteen
years attained by a patent owner in the full dataset (Regression 7). Even
in the subset with a twenty-year patent term (Regression 4) and the subset
with a post-URAA twenty-year patent term (Regression 5) subsets
presumably more relevant to the impact of the scheme going forward
application of the five-year cap variable was uncorrelated with shorter
final effective patent life. But application of the five-year cap is negatively
correlated with reaching at least 12.6 years. No drug in the dataset that hit
the five-year cap secured fourteen years of effective patent life.
Interpretation of these results is complicated by the fact that more drugs
in the dataset were subject to the two-year cap for transitional patents than
the currently applicable five-year cap. Within our dataset of 642 drugs,
ninety-five (15%) hit the five-year cap.193 (These drugs had an average
effective patent life of 5.19 years before restoration and 10.20 years after
restoration, lower than the overall population averages.) But if a product
was already in clinical trials on September 24, 1984, then a patent issued
before that date could receive no more than two years of patent term
192. See, e.g., Lietzan, supra note 38, at 105 06 (finding less variability in average clinical program
length when drugs are classified by pharmacological class).
193. This is consistent with Beall s findings. Beall et al., supra note 25, at 21 (reporting that thirteen
of eighty-three drugs, or 15%, hit the five-year cap). When the drugs that hit the two-year cap are
excluded from the analysis, however, 18% of the remaining drugs in our dataset (95 of 529) hit the
five-year cap, compared to 30% (thirteen of forty-four) in Beall s dataset. Id.
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restoration. This transition provision turned out to apply to 113 drugs
18% of the dataset including drugs approved well into the 1990s and
indeed one approved in 2000.194
Imposition of the transitional two-year cap has two implications. First,
it means the discussion above understates the percentage of drugs likely
to be affected by five-year cap going forward. In a counterfactual world
in which Congress included only the five-year cap, 151 drugs (24% of the
dataset) would have been subject to that cap. These drugs would have had
a final effective patent life of 9.97 years. Second, imposition of the twoyear cap was negatively correlated with effective patent life in every
regression in which the variable had explanatory power. This means it
drives down effective patent life, so the average final effective patent life
reported in this study 11.58 years for the entire dataset is lower than it
would have been if only current law (the five-year cap) had applied. Had
only the five-year cap applied, the dataset would have had an average final
effective patent life of 11.96 years (median 13.16). In this world, the
average final effective patent life for the 24% of drugs subject to the cap
(9.97 years) would have been meaningfully shorter than the population
average.
D.

Actual Exclusivity in the Market

The findings in this Article relating to effective patent life will be
important for scholars and policymakers focusing on drug innovation
policy, but they are subject to one cautionary note. As opponents of patent
term restoration pointed out in the late 1970s and early 1980s, effective
patent life (of one patent, among many) is different from actual exclusivity
in the market.195 Actual exclusivity is the time before launch of a generic
copy (or a biosimilar, for a biologic). This period could be shorter than
the effective life of the patent as reported in this dataset for instance, if
the restored patent is later invalidated, or if patent infringement litigation
leads to a settlement allowing the generic company to launch before patent
expiry. It could be shorter if it is possible for a generic company to satisfy
the generic drug approval standard without infringing the patent which
might be the case, for example, if the patent selected for restoration covers

194. This was Mifeprex (mifepristone), approved by FDA for termination of early pregnancy in
September 2000.
195. See, e.g., Lietzan, supra note 79, at 83 84 (noting that when drug patent owners pushed for
patent term restoration in the late 1970s and early 1980s, opponents such as Public Citizen argued
that shortened effective patent life was irrelevant, because it did not correspond with actual exclusivity
in the market).
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the dosage form, formulation, or manufacturing process.196 Actual
exclusivity could also be longer than the effective patent life reported in
this dataset.197 It could be longer if the market for the drug is too small to
attract generic competitors. It could be longer if the drug is difficult (or
expensive) to make, or too complex for proposed copies to meet the
generic drug approval standard (which requires a showing that the active
ingredients of the two drugs are the same). Or there could be other
intellectual property effectively preventing generic competition, including
later-expiring patents.
Whether effective patent life corresponds to actual market exclusivity
is important but focusing on actual market exclusivity may miss the
point. The distortion of drug patent life by federal regulatory requirements
raises concerns because our legal system uses the promise of patent
protection to encourage the discovery and development of new drugs.198
Even if the life of the restored patent turns out not to dictate the timing of
actual generic launch, when a company is starting clinical trials in our
dataset, an average of 19.58 years before the final (restored) patent
expiry the factors affecting market exclusivity may be unknown and
actual market exclusivity impossible to predict. The company does not
even know whether the trials will succeed, and in fact chances are the
trials will not.199 Patent life is more certain; when one applies for a patent,
one generally knows (subject to delay at the PTO and patent term
adjustment) what the expiration date will be. Even though a company does
not know how long its clinical program will take, it knows that if the drug
is approved, it will have whatever remains of the patent life plus as many
as five more years to make up for time lost to research and development.
196. The FDA will approve a generic drug if it has the same active ingredient, route of
administration, dosage form, strength, and labeling as its reference product, and if it is bioequivalent
to that reference product. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4). In addition, if the agency has approved a special
petition (known as a suitability petition ) from the generic manufacturer, it will approve a generic
copy with a different route of administration, dosage form, or strength. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iii). It does
not compare the manufacturing methods. Nor does the formulation have to be the same, although in
some cases FDA will require the same inactive ingredients in the same concentration. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.94(a)(9) (2019).
197. See, e.g., Ass n for Accessible Med., Comment Letter on Public Meeting Concerning the
Administration of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 7
9 (Nov. 17, 2017), https://beta.regulations.gov/document/FDA-2017-N-3615-0097#collapseAttach
mentMetadata-ember36 [https://perma.cc/2EAM-FGTR] (describing a variety of factors considered
by generic companies when deciding whether to pursue a generic copy of a drug that has no patent
protection).
198. See supra section I.B. Patent protection provides this encouragement because it is designed to
prevent competitors from making, using, or selling the invention for a fixed time period. 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a).
199. See sources cited supra note 54.
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Potential effective patent life is thus more likely to be driving investment
decisions at the beginning of the 19.58 years than is speculation about
actual market exclusivity.
We calculated the actual market exclusivity period meaning the time
from new drug approval to generic drug launch for 227 of the 554 drugs
in the dataset.200 Generic drug launch in this context means launch of a
generic drug containing the same active ingredient, even if the generic
drug approval was based on a different innovative product containing the
same ingredient.201 The average exclusivity period was 12.62 years
(median 13.28). This matches the findings of earlier studies.202 Another
265 drugs had no generic launch as of the date we concluded data
collection. Although it is tempting to consider the number of years since
their FDA approval as their effective market exclusivity, many such as
Posicor (mibefradil dihydrochloride), Normiflo (ardeparin sodium),
Rezulin (troglitazone), and Manopax (flosequinan) were withdrawn
from the market, including some for safety reasons (meaning that no
generic could ever be approved).203 The numbers of years since FDA
approval of these drugs cannot be construed as their effective
market exclusivity.
We performed three regressions to identify the determinants of actual
market exclusivity. Regression 9 considered all 227 drugs for which we
have generic launch data, Regression 10 considered the subset of 131
drugs with seventeen-year patent terms, and Regression 11 considered the
subset of ninety-six drugs with twenty-year patent terms. The results
appear in Table 4 in the Appendix. Regressions 10 and 11 had no
explanatory power and are not discussed further. In the 227 drugs for
200. IQVIA provided the launch dates. See supra note 143. For 265 drugs, IQVIA reported no
generic launch to date. As explained in note 143, we dropped another six drugs because the dates
were not useable in our analysis and fifty-six drugs for which IQVIA lacked data.
201. This was necessary because the IQVIA data did not identify the innovative product on which
the generic drug was based.
202. See, e.g., Beall et al., supra note 25, at 20 (reporting average exclusivity in the market time
to generic market entry as 13.75 years for eighty-three top-selling drugs, and identifying the quarter
of generic market entry as the one in which a prescription for a therapeutically equivalent generic
drug appeared in Medicaid prescription data aggregated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
data); Bo Wang et al., Research Letter: Variations in Time of Market Exclusivity Among Top-Selling
Prescription Drugs in the United States, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 635 (2015) (finding median
market exclusivity period of 12.5 years for the 175 drugs that experienced generic competition by the
end of 2012, out of the 437 top-selling drugs by sales in the United States between 2000 and 2011,
also using Medicaid prescription data as proof of generic competition); Henry Grabowski et al.,
Updated Trends in US Brand-Name and Generic Drug Competition, 19 J. MED. ECON. 207 (2014)
(finding that non-biologic drugs experiencing initial generic entry in 2011 2012 had enjoyed 12.9
years of actual exclusivity in the market, using IQVIA data to confirm generic launch).
203. We did not attempt to identify every drug withdrawn from the market.
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which we have generic launch data, the final effective patent life after
restoration is positively associated with actual market exclusivity
(coefficient 0.44, p=0.024), as is the number of days of patent life restored
(but the coefficient here is small). These were the only independent
variables with explanatory power, and they explain only 22% of the
variation in actual market exclusivity.204
CONCLUSION
The findings in this Article have significant policy implications. The
two most significant results are as follows. First, in every regression, the
length of the proxy-preclinical period and the length of the clinical period
had negative explanatory power. As these periods got longer, the final
effective patent life (after patent term restoration) consistently got shorter.
The irony for inventors of new drugs is that drugs requiring more
premarket investment (more years of research) may enjoy less patent life,
in essence a distortion of the patent term. Second, with a handful of
exceptions, therapeutic categories were generally not correlated with final
effective patent life (that is, after restoration). It is convention in
innovation policy to work by therapeutic category, but when focusing on
the effect of research and development challenges and regulatory
requirements, it may be more appropriate to focus on pharmacologic
class instead.
Longer clinical programs lead to shorter effective patent life, even after
patent term restoration has been awarded. Although the impact is small,
even a modest impact could be financially significant for an innovator.
This finding contributes to a growing body of literature asking whether
the U.S. legal system may be systematically skewing drug research
incentives away from research programs that require a substantial
investment of time. The decision to limit recovery to 50% of the days in
clinical trials and, perhaps more importantly, to cap recovery at five years,
may warrant reexamination.
Other policy implications relate to the changes made to the patent term
in 1994. Lawmakers in 1984 made a conscious choice to permit
restoration of continuation patents so that drug companies could achieve
fourteen years of effective patent life under section 156. The ability to
choose a later-issued child patent helped mitigate the distorting effect of
the premarket regulatory regime. This was possible because the patent
term was calculated from patent issuance. Lawmakers in 1994 changed
204. Wang and colleagues found that median market exclusivity differed by therapeutic area,
ranging from 14.8 years (dermatology products and antivirals) to 8.0 (analgesics). Wang et al., supra
note 202, at 636.
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how the patent term was calculated, and now a child patent is less likely
to reach fourteen years. The decision to unravel the choice made in
1984 if a conscious decision was even made was not vetted publicly.
The consequences could be profound.
Under the changes made in 1994, a drug company may need to select
a later-issued original patent to achieve the same result: fourteen years of
effective patent life. This patent is unlikel to cover the drug s active
ingredient; instead, it may cover another aspect of the drug such as its
formulation. These patents ma be inherentl less valuable to the drug s
inventor because it may be possible for generic and biosimilar applicants
to develop copies that satisfy regulatory requirements for copies and yet
do not infringe the patent. If these patents do not have the same value, the
fourteen years of effective patent life is illusory. Policymakers effectively
nullified the decision from 1984 without meaningful public discussion of
the implications for drug innovation discussion that is therefore
overdue. If instead these patents do preclude approval of generic and
biosimilar applications, their use in this fashion is fully consistent with the
intent of Congress in 1984, and public rhetoric about the insidious nature
of later-issued drug patents should be recalibrated.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1:
Average Effective Patent Life Without Restoration
Over Time by Patent Issuance Date
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y = 1E-07x6 - 0.0016x5 + 8.1059x4 - 21545x3 + 3E+07x2 - 3E+10x + 9E+12
R² = 0.9107

Notes:
Some drugs had negative effective patent life before restoration. To
generate this figure, all negative values were replaced with zero.
There is a potential for selection bias at the beginning and end of the
interval studied, as follows. First, section 156 of the Patent Act did not
take effect until September 1984, and the earliest approved drug in the
dataset received FDA approval in August 1984. Any patent term
restoration request relating to a patent issued in the 1970s necessarily
related to a drug approved in August 1984 or later. These patents would
have had an exceptionally short effective patent life. And other drugs with
patents issued in the 1970s that reached the market more quickly will not
appear in the dataset, because the earliest approved drugs were approved
in August 1984. The information for these early patent issuance years will
be skewed to suggest a shorter than warranted average effective patent
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life. The steep slope at the beginning of the interval studied is likely an
artifact of enactment in 1984. Second, there may also be skewing in the
final years of patent issuance. If a patent issued in the early 2010s and
covers a drug that appears in our dataset, it necessarily covers a drug
approved before November 2015. Meanwhile, other patents issued in the
early 2010s will not appear in the dataset if the drugs in question are still
in development. The information for these later patent issue years will be
skewed to suggest a longer than warranted average effective patent life.
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Figure 2:
Average Effective Patent Life Without Restoration
Over Time by Drug Approval Date

Effective Patent Life in Years
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Note:
Some drugs had negative effective patent life before restoration. To
generate this figure, all negative values were replaced with zero.
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Figure 3:
Average Effective Patent Life With Restoration
Over Time by Patent Issuance Date

Effective Patent Life inYears
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y = 9E-08x6 - 0.001x5 + 5.1134x4 - 13610x3 + 2E+07x2 - 2E+10x + 5E+12
R² = 0.9496

Note:
As was true of Figure 1, and for the same reasons, there is a potential
for selection bias for patents issued in the earliest years shown and patents
issued in the latest years shown.
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Figure 4:
Average Effective Patent Life With Restoration
Over Time by FDA Approval Date
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Table 1:
Determinants of Effective Patent Life Before Patent Term
Restoration and With Restoration
Regression

Regression

Regression

1 (OLS)

2 (Tobit)

(Tobit)

3

Regression

Regression

(Tobit)

5 (Tobit)

6 (OLS)

Dependent

Effective

Effective

variable

patent life

patent life with life with

life with

before

restoration

restoration when

restoration when restoration

the patent had a

the patent had a when the patent when the 5-

17- year term

20-year term

(pre-URAA or

(post-URAA or post-URAA 20- applies

transitional)

transitional)

year term

314

328

150

restoration

Observations 642
Adjusted R2
Pseudo R

Effective patent Effective patent Effective
life with

patent life with
restoration

is subject to the year cap

0.84

2

Child patent

642

Effective patent

Regression 4

95
0.68

0.36

0.37

0.56

0.46

1.5228***

1.7076***

5.135

5.35

-0.789***

-6.01***

(0.41)

(0.47)

(1.94)

(0.89)

(0.22)

(2.24)

Child patent

-08360

-1.282**

-5.118

Omitted

Omitted

7.05***

with

(0.47)

(0.57)

(1.97)

Child patent

-1.4522**

-1.736***

Omitted

with

(0.48)

(0.57)

Child patent

-2.0196***

-2.799***

with post-

(0.49)

(0.57)

Length of

-0.0016***

-0.002***

-0.0011***

-0.003***

-0.002***

-0.0021***

clinical

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

Length of

-0.0018***

-0.002***

-0.002***

-0.003***

-0.002***

-0.0017***

proxy

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

Patent with

3.5268***

4.158***

4.894***

Omitted

Omitted

Omitted

transitional

(0.43)

(0.53)

(0.65)

(2.23)

transition 17year term
-5.215

Omitted

(0.92)

6.3905***
(2.07)

transition 20year term
Omitted

-6.131

Omitted

(0.90)

5.17**
(2.34)

URAA 20year term

testing period

preclinical
period

17-year term
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Regression 1

Regression 2

Regression 3

Regression 4

Regression 5

Regression

(OLS)

(Tobit)

(Tobit)

(Tobit)

(Tobit)

6 (OLS)

Patent with

2.4389***

2.455***

Omitted

-0.1909

Omitted

Omitted

transitional

(0.39)

(0.46)

Patent with

2.9172***

3.019***

post-URAA

(0.49)

(0.59)

-1.3169***

(0.22)

20-year term
Omitted

Omitted

Omitted

Omitted

Omitted

Omitted

Omitted

20-year term
Application

-3.334***

-4.833***

-1.305***

of 2-year cap (0.29)

(0.41)

(0.77)

(0.31)

Application

-0.334

-0.1880

-0.302

-0.574

of 5-year cap (0.23)

-0.4393

(0.27)

(0.47)

(0.19)

(0.36)

Number of

0.0010***

0.001**

0.0020***

0.0016***

-1.8035

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(2.24)

-0.0017***

days restored (0.00)
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Regression 1

Regression 2

Regression 3

Regression 4

Regression 5

Regression

(OLS)

(Tobit)

(Tobit)

(Tobit)

(Tobit)

6 (OLS)

Therapeutic

Antipsychotic

Antipsychotic Antidepressant

Gastrointestinal Antiemetics

categories

-1.3127*

-1.567**

-3.904**

drugs

1.817*

(1.55)

0.775*

(1.089)

(0.64)

(0.79)

Respiratorypulm- (0.456)

Analgesics

onary drugs

Immunological

-3.192***

-3.204**

agents

(0.86)

(1.47)

0.764*

Anticonvulsants

Cardiovascular

(0.392)

1.447**

drugs

Analgesics

(0.664)

-2.303*

-1.502***

(1.39)

(0.50)

Antipsychotic

Hormonal

-3.147**

agents

(1.47)

0.622*

Antibacterials

(0.344)

-2.713*
(1.41)
Hormonal agents
-2.682*
(1.49)
Anticonvulsants
-3.095**
(1.56)
Metabolicbonedisease agents
-3.015*
(1.65)
Antiobesity drugs
-4.316*
(2.28)
Dental agents
-4.030**
(1.92)

Notes:
Estimated coefficients are given with standard errors in parentheses
underneath. Variables are identified as having explanatory power as
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follows: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
Linear regression attempts to model the relationship between variables
by fitting a linear equation to observed data. This study utilizes a
multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, a statistical method
of analysis, in order to estimate the relationship between a dependent
variable and a collection of independent variables. The extent of
explanatory power is measured by the Adjusted R2.
Right-censoring tobit regressions estimate linear relationships between
variables when there is censoring of a variable at an upper limit. This
occurs when a value at or above some threshold, all take on the value of
that threshold, so that the true value might be equal to the threshold, but it
might also be higher. Accounting for the fact that the data is censored at
the upper end provides a more accurate estimate, in cases where an OLS
regression would be biased and inaccurate. The extent of explanatory
power is measured by the Pseudo R2.
The regressions used in this analysis were:
Regression 1: In this OLS regression the dependent variable is the
effective patent life before restoration. The independent variables are
listed in the second column of Table 1.
Regression 2: In this right-censored tobit regression the dependent
variable is the effective patent life with restoration. The independent
variables are listed in the third column of Table 1. The regression included
642 observations, 427 uncensored and 215 right-censored.
Regression 3: In this right-censored tobit regression the dependent
variable is the effective patent life with restoration when the patent had a
17- year term (pre-URAA or transitional). The independent variables are
listed in the fourth column of Table 1. Since the regression examines only
patents that had a seventeen-year term, all variables associated with a
twenty-year term are omitted. The regression included 314 observations,
203 uncensored and 111 right-censored.
Regression 4: In this right-censored tobit regression the dependent
variable is the effective patent life with restoration when the patent has a
twenty-year term (post-URAA or transitional). The independent variables
are listed in the fifth column of Table 1. Since the regression examines
only patents that had a twenty-year term, all variables associated with a
seventeen-year term are omitted. In addition, in this subset of the data,
since patents with post-URAA twenty-year term is perfectly correlated
with patents with transitional twenty-year term, only one of the two
variables can be included in the regression. Accordingly, the variable,
patent with post-URAA twenty-year term, is omitted. The regression
included 328 observations, 224 uncensored and 104 right-censored.
Regression 5: In this right-censored tobit regression the dependent
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variable is the effective patent life with restoration when the patent is
subject to the post-URAA twenty-year term (i.e., no transitional terms).
The independent variables are listed in the sixth column of Table 1. Given
the relatively small sample size in this regression (150 observations),
several variables were omitted due to their lack of explanatory power and
correlation with other variables. The regression included 150
observations, 100 uncensored and 50 right-censored.
Regression 6: In this OLS regression the dependent variable is the
effective patent life with restoration when the five-year cap applies. The
independent variables are listed in the last column of Table 1. Given the
relatively small sample size in this regression (95 observations), several
variables were omitted due to their lack of explanatory power and
correlation with other variables.
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Table 2:
Determinants of Effective Patent Life With Restoration
Regression 7 (OLS)

Regression 8 (Probit)

Dependent variable

Percent of 14 Years Achieved

Whether the Final Effective

Observations

642

Patent Life Was > 12.6 years

Adjusted

R2

0.77

Pseudo R2
Child patent

629

0.65
10.8896***

1.1862

(2.95)

(1.49)

Child patent with Transition 17-

-6.0421*

-0.7505

year term

(3.38)

(1.54)

Child patent with Transition 20-

-10.3699**

-1.06

year term

(3.45)

(1.54)

Child patent with post-URAA

-14.5841***

-2.5403

20-year term

(3.50)

(1.54)

Length of clinical testing period

-0.0116***

-0.0010***

(0.00)

(0.00)

Length of proxy-preclinical

-0.0130***

-0.0014***

testing period

(0.00)

(0.00)

Transitional 17-year term

25.2066***

3.1591*

(3.06)

(1.50)

17.4546***

1.9636

(2.81)

(1.45)

20.8978***

2.2263

(3.52)

(1.50)

-9.4505***

-2.9961***

(2.06)

(0.55)

-2.9621

-1.3181***

(1.61)

(0.34)

0.0075***

-0.0002

(0.00)

(0.00)

Transitional 20-year term

Post-URAA 20-year term

Application of 2-year cap

Application of 5-year cap

Number of days restored
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Antipsychotics

Blood Glucose Regulators

-9.3821*

-1.67*

(4.59)

(0.84)

1377

Antiemitics
-2.424*
(1.35)
Opthalmic Agents
-1.8760**
(0.83)
Analgesics
-2.4764**
(1.03)
Genetic Corenzme Disorder
Agents
-2.668*
(1.00)

Notes:
Estimated coefficients are given with standard errors in parentheses
underneath. Variables are identified as having explanatory power as
follows: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Regression 8 was run with the
full dataset of 642 observations, but 13 observations were dropped due to
their ability to perfectly predict either success or failure.
Again, linear regression attempts to model the relationship between
two variables by fitting a linear equation to observed data. This study
utilizes a multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, a statistical
method of analysis, in order to estimate the relationship between a
dependent variable and a collection of independent variables.
Statistically, a probit model is a type of regression in which the
dependent variable can take only two values. In this case, the dependent
variable is Whether the Final Effective Patent Life Was > 12.6 years, and
the dependent variable is either 1 ( es, the final effective patent life was
> 12.6 ears) or 0 (no, the final effective patent life was not >
12.6 years).
Specifically, the regressions used in this analysis were:
Regression 7: In this OLS regression the dependent variable is the
Percent of 14 Years Achieved. The independent variables are listed in the
second column of Table 2.
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Regression 8: This is a probit regression. In this probit regression the
dependent variable is a binary indicator of the Percent of fourteen Years
Achieved. The dependent variables are listed in the second column of
Table 2. In the case of thirteen observations, they either perfectly
predicted success or failure and were therefore dropped.
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Table 3:
Average Effective Patent Life by Therapeutic Category
Sorted by Average Effective Patent Life with Restoration
Therapeutic

Average Length of

Average Effective

Average Effective

Category (n)

Clinical Program in

Patent Life Without

Patent Life

Years (Median)

Restoration in Years

With Restoration in

(Range)

(Median) (Range)

Years (Median)
(Range)

Antipsychotics (8)

8.67 (7.96)

4.51 (3.28)

8.29 (7.61)

(2.80, 16.34)

(0.24, 12.14)

(4.21, 14.01)

Sleep disorder agents

4.87 (4.41)

6.26 (7.00)

9.61 (9.04)

(6)

(3.42, 6.89)

(-0.79, 11.63)

(2.90, 14.01)

Analgesics (13)

6.76 (7)

6.75 (7.01)

9.81 (10.98)

(2.61, 11.06)

(3.08,10.36)

(5.08, 13.72)

8.67 (8.05)

6.95 (6.88)

10.01 (10.52)

(1.74, 16.13)

(-1.50, 13.96)

(2.00, 14.01)

5.56 (5.17)

6.73 (7.89)

10.33 (11.36)

(1.19, 11.70)

(0.02, 12.35)

(2.02, 14.01)

6.51 (6.87)

7.39 (7.53)

10.44 (11.56)

(1.34, 14.32)

(0.02, 13.55)

(2.95, 14.01)

8.11 (7.81)

6.56 (6.76)

10.58 (11.76)

Antidepressants (16)

Vaccines (15)

Hormonal (32)

Anticonvulsants (13)

(4.52, 15.07)

(1.34, 13.19)

(6.05, 14.01)

Ophthalmic agents

4.45 (4.27)

8.17 (8.41)

10.69 (11.35)

(30)

(1.04, 9.54)

(0.67, 12.98)

(2.67, 14.01)

Respiratory/pulmonary

6.36 (4.95)

7.62 (8.32)

10.84 (12.04)

(33)

(1.54, 17.80)

(-2.30, 13.05)

(2.70, 14.01)

Genetic/enzyme

5.13 (4.78)

8.55 (10.04)

11.03 (12.36)

disorder agents (7)

(2.21, 11.20)

(2.02, 12.25)

(5.49, 13.18)

Cardiovascular drugs

5.98 (5.12)

8.40 (9.26)

11.11 (12.63)

(192)

(1.88, 15.63)

(-2.70, 13.80)

(2.00, 14.01)

Metabolic bone

6.72 (6.39)

7.97 (7.83)

11.31 (11.58)

disease agents (10)

(1.71, 15.37)

(1.61, 12.78)

(4.71, 14.01)

Gastrointestinal drugs

6.55 (5.52)

8.48 (9.56)

11.41 (13.40)

(19)

(1.33, 16.92)

(2.31, 13.21)

(6.02, 14.01)

Hematologic agents

5.87 (5.93)

8.78 (9.73)

11.73 (13.42)

(35)

(1.60, 13.07)

(1.76, 13.67)

(3.77, 14.01)

Antibacterials (48)

4.61 (4.41)

9.11 (10.12)

11.79 (13.02)

(1.35, 17.25)

(-0.76, 13.86)

(3.69, 14.01)
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Therapeutic

Average Length of

Average Effective

Average Effective

Category (n)

Clinical Program in

Patent Life Without

Patent Life

Years (Median)

Restoration in Years

With Restoration in

(Range)

(Median) (Range)

Years (Median)
(Range)

Antidementia (5)

Antifungals (16)

Antineoplastics (73)

6.08 (5.21)

8.67 (7.32)

11.93 (12.32)

(2.98, 12.87)

(4.88, 13.07)

(7.80, 14.01)

5.23 (5.21)

9.43 (10.50)

12.16 (13.36)

(1.75, 9.27)

(2.64, 12.52)

(6.18, 14.01)

6.47 (6.21)

9.51 (10.55)

12.23 (13.26)

(1.93, 13.31)

(-0.33, 13.80)

(3.36, 14.01)

Blood glucose

5.94 (5.39)

9.15 (9.27)

12.29 (12.42)

regulators (23)

(2.45, 12.45)

(3.40, 13.84)

(8.40, 14.01)

Antiemetics (6)

7.17 (7.16)

8.98 (9.31)

12.35 (11.90)

(3.76, 10.44)

(6.11, 12.96)

(11.11,14.01)

5.09 (4.27)

9.57 (11.11)

12.46 (14.01)

Genitourinary (13)

(2.47, 9.26)

(2.96, 13.82)

(7.61, 14.01)

Immunological agents

7.12 (6.52)

9.61 (10.55)

12.47 (13.90)

(22)

(2.83, 12.96)

(2.89, 13.35)

(6.61, 14.01)

Anesthetics (8)

5.32 (5.32)

10.37 (11.39)

12.53 (14.01)

(2.68, 8.45)

(4.56, 13.67)

(7.09, 14.01)

7.22 (7.06)

9.55 (9.45)

12.53 (13.74)

(5.52, 9.68)

(5.22, 12.87)

(10.22, 14.01)

Central nervous

10.64 (8.30)

9.14 (9.69)

12.58 (13.78)

system agents (10)

(4.00, 26.22)

(3.41, 12.82)

(8.42, 14.01)

Diagnostic agents (33)

6.19 (5.02)

10.60 (11.18)

13.06 (13.72)

(3.22, 11.36)

(6.00, 13.21)

(11.01, 14.01)

Dermatological agents

5.70 (6.47)

10.38 (10.84)

13.16 (14.01)

(17)

(1.18, 9.43)

(4.10, 13.67)

(8.72, 14.01)

Antivirals (29)

4.81 (4.84)

11.28 (11.92)

13.18 (14.01)

(1.84, 10.55)

(5.56, 13.81)

(8.15, 14.01)

2.99 (2.94)

11.91 (11.73)

13.74 (14.01)

(1.42, 4.75)

(10.51, 13.59)

(12.41, 14.01)

Antiparkinson (7)

Antimigraine (6)

Note:
This table includes only therapeutic categories with five or
more observations.
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Table 4:
Determinants of Actual Market Exclusivity

Dependent variable

Regression 9 (OLS)

Regression 10 (OLS)

Regression 11 (OLS)

Actual market

Actual market

Actual market

exclusivity in subset of

exclusivity in subset of

exclusivity in subset of

drugs with generic

drugs with generic

drugs with generic

launch data

launch data and 17-year

launch data and 20-year

patent terms

patent terms

Observations

227

131

96

Adjusted R2

0.22

0.36

-0.26

No variables have any

The regression has no

explanatory power

explanatory power

Child patent

Omitted

Omitted

Omitted

Child patent with

0.3431

0.8331

Omitted

Transition 17-year

(1.74)

(1.90)

Child patent with

0.3059

Omitted

Transition 20-year

(1.66)

term
-2.8069
(1.63)

term
Child patent with

-0.2622

post-URAA 20-

(4.05)

Omitted

Omitted

year term
Length of clinical

-0.0002

-0.0004

0.0031

period

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

Length of proxy-

-0.0001

-0.0003

0.0040

preclinical period

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

Transitional 17-

1.7915

0.8648

Omitted

year term

(1.80)

(2.19)

Transitional 20-

0.2950

Omitted

year term

(1.49)

Post-URAA 20-

Omitted

Omitted

Omitted

Application of 2-

1.5854

-0.6828

3.2491

year cap

(0.97)

(1.40)

(2.45)

Application of 5-

-1.0311

0.3592

-0.2027

year cap

(1.11)

(1.48)

(2.15)

3.0770
(7.31)

year term
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Regression 9 (OLS)

Regression 10 (OLS)

Regression 11 (OLS)

Effective patent life

0.4437*

0.4246

2.0309

after restoration

(0.19)

(0.22)

(1.40)

Number of days

0.0018*

0.0020

-0.0030

restored

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

Therapeutic

Antiparasitic

categories

6.137*
(3.19)

Notes:
Estimated coefficients are given with standard errors in parentheses
underneath. Variables are identified as having explanatory power as
follows: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Please note that the adjusted R2
in Regression 11 likely results from a sample size that is too small and
independent variables that are correlated.
Again, linear regression attempts to model the relationship between
two variables by fitting a linear equation to observed data. This study
utilizes a multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, a statistical
method of analysis, in order to estimate the relationship between a
dependent variable and a collection of independent variables. The
regression used in this analysis was:
Regression 9: In this OLS regression the dependent variable is the
actual market exclusivity in the subset of drugs with generic launch data.
The coefficients of the independent variables are listed in the second
column of Table 4.
Regression 10: In this OLS regression the dependent variable is actual
market exclusivity in subset of drugs with generic launch data and
seventeen-year patent terms. The coefficients of the independent variables
are listed in the third column of Table 4. None of the independent
variables have any explanatory power.
Regression 11: In this OLS regression the dependent variable is the
actual market exclusivity in subset of drugs with generic launch data and
twenty-year patent terms. The coefficients of the independent variables
are listed in the fourth column of Table 4. The regression has no
explanatory power.

